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International economic literature has given substantial attention to the
destabilizing eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalization, a process that became par-
ticularly strong since industrial countries liberalized their capital accounts
in the 1970s and 1980s. Subsequently, in the 1990s, emerging markets
(EMs) followed suit.
Among the diverse proposals for reforming the “international ﬁnancial
architecture” aimed at creating a more stable environment is taxation of in-
ternational capital ﬂows.1 The idea, in fact, has been around since Keynes
(1936) suggested that taxing ﬁnancial transactions could strengthen the
importance investors place on long-term fundamentals in pricing assets.
Decades later, the idea gained popularity in the academic community
through the Tobin Tax proposal (Tobin 1978).
Much of the recent literature has defended imposing controls on capital
inﬂow, as Chile did during the 1990s. The objective would be to minimize
the impact on EMs of capital ﬂows instability and to reduce these countries’
vulnerability to ﬁnancial crises (Stiglitz 1999; Ito and Portes 1998; Eichen-
green 1999; Fischer 2002). The proposals defend, in general, what we could
call ex ante capital controls, that is, restrictions that are deﬁned prior to
funds entering the country, thereby respecting the contracts. This type of
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1. Rogoﬀ (1999), Eichengreen (1999), Stiglitz (1999), and Fischer (2002) are excellent ref-
erences on the diverse proposals for reforming the international ﬁnancial system.control diﬀers from those the literature has called controls on capital out-
ﬂows, which are generally imposed during a ﬁnancial crisis, typically after,
or ex post, the entry of capital, and can thus be viewed as breaching con-
tracts with foreign investors who have then already invested resources in
the country. Ex ante capital controls usually try to deter capital inﬂows but
could conceivably be also imposed to restrict capital outﬂows.
Here, we address the eﬀects of ex ante capital controls. In contrast to ex
post controls, ex ante controls should not jeopardize the emerging market
country’s reputation as they are included in contracts with foreign inves-
tors prior to their investing. We will analyze the eﬀectiveness of inﬂow con-
trols to limit short-term capital and modify the composition of ﬁnancial
inﬂows.
Several authors have suggested controls on capital inﬂows as an eco-
nomic policy measure for managing excessive capital inﬂows into EMs. In
periods of greater liquidity and low international risk aversion, it is com-
mon for substantial ﬁnancial ﬂows to move into Latin America and Asia.
The years from 2004 to 2006 were classic examples: “dollar weakness,” or
expectations of greater depreciation of the U.S. dollar due to forecasts that
the U.S. current account deﬁcit had to be reversed,2 together with low base
interest rates in developed countries. Both factors led to substantial capi-
tal inﬂows into EMs. As a result, Colombia (2004), Argentina (2005), and
Thailand (2006) adopted capital inﬂow controls to avoid accelerated ap-
preciation of theircurrency,3and many countries, including Brazil, Russia,
China, Japan, and other Asian countries, rapidly accumulated interna-
tional reserves so as to manage the abundant inﬂow of foreign currency. In
this context, discussion surrounding controls on capital inﬂow has gained
considerable steam among economists. 
The central goal of establishing capital controls is containing the in-
ﬂow of short-term capital. Short-term capital ﬂows are considered more
volatile and fungible and thus more closely related to excessive exchange
rate volatility and to sudden reversals of external ﬁnancing that lead to
harmful real results. Many articles actually argue that portfolio invest-
ments tend to be less stable than, for example, direct investment because ﬁ-
nancial assets can be sold more easily than real assets can be liquidated
(Dixit and Pyndick 1994; Frankel and Rose 1996; Dornbusch 1998). More-
over, today’s international ﬁnancial scenario includes hedge funds, many
of which are seeking immediate gains. As of August 2005, it was estimated
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2. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ(2000, 2004), Kim and Roubini (2004), Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa
(2005) are good references for discussion of the expected weakening of the U.S. Dollar as a re-
sult of the country’s record current account deﬁcits.
3. Colombia, Argentina, and Thailand have imposed Chilean-style capital inﬂow control,
which obliges investors bringing capital into the country to withhold 30 percent of the total
amount for one year at the Central Bank, without remuneration. But Colombian authorities
banned the measures just few months afterwards, alleging they were ineﬀective in containing
the capital inﬂows.that there was around US$ 1.5 trillion in the hands of these ﬁnancial insti-
tutions (Chan et al. 2006). This, together with more sophisticated infor-
mation technology, has made capital ﬂows extremely fungible. Capital
controls would also avoid excessive exchange rate appreciation and allow
the central bank to regain control of monetary policy.4
The economic literature is therefore brimming with debate about how to
manage excessive capital inﬂow in an exceptionally volatile global ﬁnancial
environment. Volatile capital accounts and consequent volatile exchange
rates (except in the case of ﬁxed exchange rates) inﬂuence decisions on in-
vesting in physical capital as investors face greater uncertainty and higher
costs on currency hedge operations, thereby aﬀecting potential gross do-
mestic product (GDP). In light of this, a few authors have suggested adopt-
ing capital inﬂow controls or accumulating international reserves as a way
of handling heavy inﬂow of foreign currency and reducing the threat of
sudden stops.
Forbes (2003) concludes that liberalization of capital accounts around
the world did in fact intensify global ﬁnancial instability, but the correla-
tion between capital controls and limiting vulnerability to conﬁdence crises
is not particularly close or direct, as many writers have argued. Forbes
(2004) also observes that the controls diminish microeconomic eﬃciency,
for example, by increasing the cost of capital of small- and medium-sized
companies, which have less access to ﬁnancial markets. Large companies
have access to the international ﬁnancial market and to ways of circum-
venting restrictions on external ﬁnancing so that they are less impacted by
capital controls.
Glick and Hutchison (2004) explore the eﬀectiveness of controls in
avoiding or delaying ﬁnancial crises. Based on an analysis of panel data
from sixty-nine countries, they conclude that restricting capital did not
bring the desired results. Eichengreen and Leblang (2003), analyzing a
panel of forty-seven countries, examine whether capital controls were ef-
fective in reducing the impact of ﬁnancial crises in the real economy. They
conclude that the controls impaired economic growth in periods of stabil-
ity but that they eased the eﬀect on the country’s product once the crisis un-
folded. However, these papers do not separate the eﬀects of capital controls
on inﬂows from those on outﬂows.
This article narrows the analysis of the eﬀectiveness of capital controls.
We explore whether controls on capital inﬂows are eﬀective in limiting and
selecting capital ﬂows. Thus, we analyze whether this type of control eﬀec-
tively meets its primary objective. The issue concerns positive economics
and not normative economics. Naturally, if we were to show that the con-
trols are not eﬀective—as we will indeed claim it has been the case in
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4. Cowan and De Gregorio (2005, 1) say that the goals of Chilean capital controls were to
“stem net inﬂows, avoid a large appreciation and keep control of monetary policy.”Brazil—whether the controls are desirable or not would become irrelevant
for policy purposes.
In general, the literature addresses short-term capital controls without
considering the capacity of international investors to avoid the restrictions
imposed. The general rule has been to implicitly assume that de jure impo-
sition for capital controls is the same as their de facto application. How-
ever, developed and sophisticated ﬁnancial markets present diverse substi-
tute assets that may be used to engineer ﬁnancial transactions that avoid
part or all of the costs incurred by the capital controls. Garcia and Barcin-
ski (1998) and Garcia and Valpassos (2000) focus on this issue for Brazil.
They indicate the ineﬀectiveness of inﬂow controls in reducing the inﬂow
of capital seeking the high returns of Brazilian public debt between 1994
and 1996. Papers addressing the case of Chile, such as those of Nadal-de-
Simone and Sorsa (1999), Edwards, Valdés, and De Gregorio (2000), and
Cowan and De Gregorio (2005), also stress that circumvention of capital
controls may have limited its eﬀectiveness in changing the composition of
the ﬁnancial inﬂows.
In this paper, we conduct econometric exercises—based on an analysis
of impulse response functions inspired by the vector autoregression (VAR)
analysis of Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997)—that show that the capital con-
trols were only eﬀective in restricting ﬁnancial capital inﬂows in Brazil in
the 1990s for two to six months. Our updated results corroborate those
from previous papers.
The novelty of this paper is in the methodology aimed at explaining why
capital controls lost de facto eﬀectiveness. This paper’s main contribution is
its focus on the limiting eﬀects that the avoidance of capital controls prac-
ticed by ﬁnancial market players had on the eﬀectiveness of controls on cap-
ital inﬂows. Based on interviews withﬁnancial market players active during
the analyzed period, we exemplify methods (ﬁnancial strategies) that could
have been used to avoid capital control laws in Brazil during the 1990s.
The article is divided as follows: after this introduction, section 2.2
brieﬂy discusses capital control legislation, section 2.3 presents a VAR
analysis aimed at measuring the eﬀectiveness of the capital controls in re-
ducing short-term ﬁnancial inﬂows sections 2.4 and 2.5 reports cases of
avoidance of capital restrictions that explain how capital controls were ren-
dered almost ineﬀective, and section 2.6 contains the conclusion.
2.2 Capital Controls in Brazil
Brazil’s exchange rate and capital controls legislation is highly complex
and confusing, mixing normative rulings from the period of the Vargas ad-
ministration in the 1930s with modern resolutions. Exchange rate regula-
tion is still considered an impediment to capital ﬂows due to its complex-
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ued development of the Brazilian ﬁnancial market.5
The following economic papers address Brazil’s tangled exchange rate
and foreign capital legislation: Franco (1990), Cardoso and Goldfajn
(1997), Garcia and Barcinski (1998), Garcia and Valpassos (2000), Arida
(2003), Franco and Pinho Neto (2004), and Goldfajn and Minella (2005).
The annual bulletins of Brazil’s Central Bank also address the issue, dis-
cussing exchange rate policy and summarizing the legal proceedings of the
institution, the National Monetary Council (CMN), and the Ministry of
Finance during the course of the year. In this section, we present an
overview of this legislation to oﬀer a context for discussing the eﬀective-
ness of controls on capital inﬂows.
The legal framework for exchange rate transactions and foreign capital
establishes the following key points: foreign exchange must be converted
into the national currency, the real (BRL), which is the only legal tender in
the country; resources secured oﬀshore or those addressed in Law 4131/626
must be brought back into the country; export revenues earned abroad
must be brought back into the country (surrender requirements); and
private exchange rate transactions are prohibited, meaning the Central
Bank holds a monopoly on exchange rate transactions. In summary, the
legal framework is aimed at keeping all possible foreign exchange in the
country.
In March of 2005, the CMN simpliﬁed currency legislation in an eﬀort
to streamline and reduce the costs of capital ﬂow with Brazil. It did not,
however, change the legal framework or any laws, but rather published new
CMN resolutions. These measures are part of a process of liberalization
and correction of the asymmetries of legislation governing currency trans-
actions with other countries, which the Central Bank undertook some
years ago. Among the principal measures, we note merging of the free rate
(MCTL) and ﬂoating rate (MCTF) exchange markets as Brazil still had 
a de jure (but not de facto) system with multiple exchange rates; authori-
zation to make direct oﬀshore remittances without use of the CC-5 ac-
counts;7 a longer period for bringing foreign currency revenues from ex-
ports back into the country; and authorization of foreign forward currency
agreements (ACC) for exportation of services.
Much of prevailing exchange rate legislation was established over sixty
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5. Reforms of exchange rate regulations are also needed to support the increased amount
of international trade, but we will not touch on this important issue here.
6. Law 4131 of 1962 regulates foreign capital in the country.
7. CC-5 accounts were maintained by those not residing in Brazil and were created by the
Central Bank’s bulletin number 5 in 1969. These resources had free access to the MCTF to
purchase foreign currency and send it oﬀshore. It also authorized remittance from others
through the account. CC-5 accounts were the main vehicle for both residents and nonresi-
dents to access foreign markets.years ago. Only exchange rate rules for foreign direct investments (FDIs)
remained stable as Franco and Pinho Neto (2004) emphasize.
In 1931, Decree 20.451/31 conceded the monopoly of exchange rate
transactions to the Banco do Brasil and established what was called the
“centralization of foreign exchange transactions.” Decree 25.258/33 con-
solidated the exchange rate policy and deﬁned “illicit exchange rate trans-
actions” as those conducted outside the oﬃcial monopoly or subsequently
by establishments the monopoly holder authorized for such. Today this
holder is the Central Bank of Brazil. This Decree 25.258/33 is still in eﬀect
and stipulates that “understating the value of export cover or increasing
prices of imported goods to obtain undue cover is punishable by law.” Un-
til today, this 1933 ruling requires exporters to convert their oﬀshore rev-
enues into domestic currency (surrender requirements) and penalizes over-
pricing of imports and underpricing of exports. The maximum term for
bringing export revenues back to Brazil has changed numerous times. As
noted in the preceding, in March of 2005 the term was extended to 210 days
after shipping, as compared to the previous 180 days (Resolution 3266/05).
Rules for foreign capital in Brazil were consolidated under Law 4.131 of
1962, which remains in eﬀect today. As Franco and Pinho Neto (2004) noted,
“subsequent laws smoothed some of the more prominent edges of Law
4.131/62,” but government authorities still have substantial discretionary
power to impose or reverse restrictive measures for exchange rate ﬂows.
In general, current legislation still clearly allows the CMN to set mea-
sures for controlling foreign capital ﬂows. One example is the set of restric-
tive measures that may be enacted in the event of “urgent needs of foreign
exchange,” as deﬁned in Article 28 of Law 4.131/62:8 simple administrative
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8. Law 4.131/62 Art. 28
“Art. 28—Any time there is extreme impurity in the balance of payments, or serious
grounds for assessing there will be, the National Monetary Council may impose restrictions,
for a limited period of time, on the entry and exit of revenues in foreign currency, and to this
end, grant the Banco do Brasil a complete or partial monopoly on exchange rate trans-
actions.
§ 1—In the case provided for in this article, remittance of capital return are prohibited, and
remittance of their proﬁts limited to a maximum of 10% (ten percent) per year, related to cap-
ital and reinvestments registered in the currency of the country of origin, in the terms set
forth in Articles 3 and 4 of this Law.
§ 2—Revenues exceeding the percentage ﬁxed by the National Monetary Council, as set
forth in the preceding paragraph, must be listed with the Central Bank of Brazil, which, if
the restriction provided for in this article is extended for over one ﬁscal year, may author-
ize the remittance, in the subsequent ﬁscal year, of the remaining amounts, if the proﬁts
made do not reach that limit.
§ 3—In the same cases of this article, the National Monetary Council may limit remittance
of funds for paying “royalties” and technical, administrative or similar support up to the an-
nual cumulative maximum of 5% (ﬁve percent) of the company’s gross earnings.
§ 4—Also in the cases of this article, the National Monetary Council is authorized to issue
rulings limiting currency spending on “International Travel.”
§ 5—There are no restrictions, however, on remittances of interest of interest or amortiza-
tion quotas contained in duly registered loan agreements.”decisions can establish controls on capital outﬂows and foreign exchange
centralization. This attests to the uncertainties surrounding Brazil’s legis-
lation, signaled by Arida, Bacha, and Lara-Rezende (2005) as one of the
major determinants of the country’s very high sovereign risk.
Until the 1980s, exchange rate legislation focused primarily on foreign
currency outﬂows in an environment of restricted capital account’s trans-
actions. It only authorized the sending of foreign capital whose ingress into
the country was documented. The remittance of proﬁts and dividends were
taxed. With the 1980 debt crisis, international capital stopped ﬂowing to-
ward Latin America so that only the egress and not the ingress of foreign
currency had to be contained.
Beginning in 1987, and especially after the 1994 institution of the Real
Plan, the Brazilian government adopted a directive for liberalizing the cur-
rent and capital accounts. In the early 1990s, inﬂows increased, and as the
economy stabilized in the second half of the decade and Brazil returned to
the foreign debt market, the pace of capital inﬂows accelerated consider-
ably. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the evolution of the inﬂow of foreign portfo-
lio investments.
Financial ﬂows to Brazil gained momentum following renegotiation of
the country’s external debt in 1994, under the Brady Plan model applied in
several Latin American countries, and with the success of the stabilization
provided by the Real Plan.
The increase of capital inﬂows that began at the end of 1991 generated
problems for managing the country’s macro economy. Abundant inﬂows of
foreign capital triggered appreciation and excessive exchange rate volatil-
ity or accumulation of international reserves and a consequent increase of
the public debt due to sterilized intervention. Additionally, most of the
capital that entered at that time was for short-term investments given the
very high real interest rates prevailing in Brazil. This type of investment,
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Fig. 2.1 Foreign portfolio capital inﬂows
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (all years).termed “carry-trade,” is usually reversed very quickly at the ﬁrst sign of de-
preciation of the receiving country’s currency. As such, it enhances the
probability of a sudden stop and also sparks greater economic volatility.
In fact, the 1990s oscillated between periods of excessive inﬂow, such as
between 1992 and 1995 and then between 1996 and the middle of 1997, and
periods of shortage of foreign capital in times of international crises (crisis
in Mexico that hit Brazil in 1995, Asian crisis in 1997, and crises in Russia
and Brazil in 1998 and 1999, respectively). In periods of excessive inﬂows,
controls were placed on capital inﬂows in an eﬀort to limit short-term cap-
ital and alleviate the eﬀects of too much foreign currency, causing appreci-
ation or, to prevent it, forcing ﬁscally expensive sterilized interventions. In
periods of shortage, controls were lifted in an attempt to attract capital to
ﬁnance the Brazilian balance of payments as current account deﬁcit grew
from 3 percent of GDP in 1995 to 5 percent in 1999. Capital controls were,
then, endogenous to external ﬁnancing conditions and to monetary policy,
as shown by Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997).
In 1987, incentives for foreign portfolio investments in the country were
provided by the Central Bank of Brazil’s Resolution 1289, which exempts
foreign investors from income tax on capital gains in Brazil. The Resolu-
tion’s Annex IV was the preferred channel by investors to make tax exempt
investments in Brazil. However, in August 1993, to contain excess inﬂows
of short-term capital aimed at proﬁting from the very high interest rates
prevailing in Brazil, the CMN prohibited using the Annex IV mechanism
to invest in government bonds. The purpose was actually to prohibit ﬁxed
income investing in general, authorizing only investing in the capital mar-
ket. But numerous loopholes in the legislation opened the door for ﬁxed in-
come investments through this mechanism, as the following section shows.
Fixed income investments then oﬃcially had to enter the country via spe-
ciﬁc funds that were subject to a tax on ﬁnancial transactions (IOF) tax of
5 percent to 9 percent.9 This was one of the main measures for controlling
capital inﬂows in the 1990s, but the market managed to bypass it in nu-
merous ways and reap gains from the high short-term interest rates with-
out paying the IOF.
In 1999, Resolution 1289 was revoked by Resolution 2689, and the IOF
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9. In November of 1993, the Foreign Capital Fixed Income Fund was established, charging
a 5 percent IOF tax (IOF stands for Tax on Financial Transactions, which is a tax that can be
easily and quickly imposed or changed by the Ministry of Finance, not having to wait to the
following ﬁscal year to take eﬀort). In October 1994, the IOF was raised to 9 percent. In
March of 1995, due to the “Tequila Eﬀect” (Mexican Crisis), the IOF was lowered to 5 per-
cent, and then raised again in August of that year to 7 percent. In April of 1997, it was low-
ered from 7 percent to 2 percent, and in March of 1999 to 0.5 percent. In August of 1999 this
IOF was eliminated, but the capital from the investment write-oﬀ had to be invested on the
BOVESPA for at least one day or be held without remuneration for ﬁfteen days. For invest-
ments of less than ninety days, a 5 percent IOF tax is levied even today (May 2006).tax was removed for ﬁxed income investments.10 Currently, most capital
ﬂows are registered in the Central Bank’s electronic registration system
(RDE),11 including most of those governed by Resolution 2689. The pro-
cess allows for closer monitoring and greater transparency of ﬁnancial
ﬂows. Only very short term (less than ninety days) ﬁxed income invest-
ments are charged the 5 percent IOF tax. There are also rules in Annex V
of Resolution 2689 for Depositary Receipts (DR), when shares of Brazil-
ian companies are issued abroad with counterpart shares in Brazil. This
movement is not registered in the RDE. Finally, until March of 2005, the
account for nonresidents (CC-5) was still in place. It was not declared on
the RDE and served as a vehicle for foreign capital to enter the country.
Controls on capital inﬂows, rather, ex ante controls on capital inﬂows, in
the 1990s focused largely on limiting short-term inﬂows, restricting ﬁxed
income investments and short-term loans. Export revenues were also
strictly regulated. As we have seen, since 1933 exporters have been subject
to surrender requirements within a speciﬁed period, 360 days as of March
2007. Forward foreign currency agreements (ACC), a mechanism to pro-
vide credit for exports, are also restricted even today to a maximum 360
days prior to shipping.
Based on the methodology of Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997), we updated
the indexes of controls on capital inﬂows and outﬂows through 2004. The
original article had constructed the indexes through 1996, and we updated
them. The methodology is simple: add  1 to the base index if the control
restricts the analyzed type of ﬂow (inﬂow or outﬂow) and –1 if it liberalizes
it. The methodology applies to the indexes of the controls on both capital
inﬂows and capital outﬂows.12
Figure 2.3 clearly shows that since the early 1990s a trend toward liber-
alizing outﬂows has prevailed, yet ﬁgure 2.2 shows that only beginning in
1997 was there an unequivocal trend toward liberalizing capital inﬂows.
This is because between 1997 and 1999 there were several crises: in Asia, in
Russia, and a currency crisis in Brazil. During those periods, because cap-
ital was ﬂeeing the country, there was no need for adopting controls that re-
stricted capital inﬂows. In 1999, Brazil ﬂoated its currency and deﬁned a
clear directive for liberalizing the capital account in order to reap the ben-
eﬁts of external savings. One example was in August of 1999, when the IOF
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10. Traders in Brazil still refer to the investment mechanism of the prevailing Resolution
2689 as “Annex IV.”
11. The RDE is divided into IED, ROF, and Portfolio registration. RDE-IED: foreign di-
rector investment; RDE-ROF: ﬁnancial transaction registration (ﬁnancing and importation,
commercial leasing, rental and freight, services and technology, currency loans, advance pay-
ment of exports, and asset investments), RDE-Portfolio: portfolio investing.
12. However simple, this methodology has the drawback of considering that all measures
had similar eﬀects on capital ﬂows, which is clearly a problem. Nevertheless, we believe that
the indexes rightly capture the major trends.tax was lifted for ﬁxed income foreign investments of over ninety days that
were previously under Annex IV.
In the next section, we provide econometric evidence of the very limited
eﬀectiveness of the controls on capital inﬂows imposed by Brazilian au-
thorities in the 1990s.
2.3 A VAR Analysis of the Eﬀectiveness of Inﬂow 
Controls in Deterring Capital Inﬂows
In this section we conduct an econometric analysis using a vector auto-
regression model to examine whether controls on capital inﬂows in Brazil
have been eﬀective in reducing the inﬂow of ﬁnancial capital.
The methodology is based on the articles of Cardoso and Goldfajn
(1997) and Edwards, Valdés, and De Gregorio (2000), which used the VAR
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Fig. 2.2 Capital inﬂows controls index (Jan. 1983   100)
Fig. 2.3 Capital outﬂows controls index (Jan. 1983   100)model to analyze the eﬀectiveness of capital controls in Brazil and in Chile,
respectively.
Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997) examined the eﬀect of controls on capital
inﬂows in the period from 1983 to 1995, concluding that the impact of in-
ﬂow controls on the total net inﬂow was temporary (around six months).
They used VAR estimation, because they showed that the controls are en-
dogenous to the dynamic of the capital inﬂows. Here, we apply a similar
procedure to the period between 1995 and 2001, using, however, diﬀerent
capital inﬂow measures and other endogenous variables. We chose not to
extend the sample beyond 2001 given there were very few changes to legis-
lation on capital inﬂows between then and 2004, so there is little to be in-
ferred from the period about the eﬀect of controls on capital ﬂows.13
Edwards, Valdés, and De Gregorio (2000) estimated a VAR to analyze
simultaneously the eﬀectiveness of controls in containing capital inﬂows
and in altering the term of foreign investments. They used as one of the en-
dogenous variables a power index for monitoring the eﬀect of control cir-
cumvention on the eﬀectiveness of restrictions on short-term capital. We
did not build a similar index from Brazil because we felt that, with the
available data, its accuracy and reliability would not be suﬃcient.14 Ed-
wards, Valdés, and De Gregorio (2000) concluded that Chile’s control on
capital inﬂows did not eﬀectively reduce the total capital inﬂow, but it did
increase the percentage of long-term ﬂows. In other words, the controls
were eﬀective in reducing short-term capital, but the total inﬂow remained
stable as more long-term capital entered the country. However, they argued
that the result may be distorted by short-term capital investments that were
declared as long term. They could not guarantee that the control power in-
dex was able to isolate the eﬀect of this type of avoidance.
In this section we estimate three VARs. They diﬀer in the variable that
measures capital inﬂows. Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show the diﬀerent series we
used on a monthly basis and accumulated in twelve months. The capital in-
ﬂow measure of the ﬁrst VAR is the Brazilian Central Bank series on the
inﬂow of portfolio investments in Brazil. The inﬂow measure of the second
VAR is the contracted exchange rate inﬂows for ﬁnancial transactions. The
measure for the third is net investments through the Annex IV channel.
The use of three diﬀerent measures of capital inﬂows is aimed at providing
robustness to our analysis. All of the VARs have the same endogenous vari-
ables: the deviation of the eﬀective real exchange rate to its equilibrium
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13. See ﬁgure 2.2 and 2.3 with the capital inﬂow controls index in section 2.2.
14. The index is formed by attributing rates of 0 to 1 for each new restrictive measure. When
the restriction was applied, the measure received a rating of 1. With the passing of time, if the
restriction was circumvented, the rating moved closer to 0, where the measure was assessed as
having lost all eﬀectiveness. Establishing a similar index for Brazil was a complex task because
it involved a large number of exchange rate of measures and because the Brazilian ﬁnancial
market was more developed than the Chilean.level, the covered interest parity diﬀerential, the measure of capital inﬂows,
and the logarithmic diﬀerence of the index of capital inﬂow controls. The
exogenous variables varied in the VAR speciﬁcations. The number of lags
for each VAR was chosen based on the Akaike and the Schwartz informa-
tion criteria. In order to obtain the impulse response functions, we applied
the Cholesky decomposition for identifying a VAR’s structural form. It is
essential to note that the results were robust with the several orderings of
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Fig. 2.4 Financial capital ﬂows measures
Source:Banco Central do Brasil (all years) and Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM).
Fig. 2.5 Financial capital ﬂows measures, accumulated in twelve months
Source:Banco Central do Brasil (all years) and Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM).contemporaneous causality among the endogenous variables, so this pos-
sible criticism does not aﬀect our results.
The main objective of the estimation of these VARs is to analyze the im-
pulse response function of the capital ﬂows to a change in capital inﬂow
controls. The variation from the index of capital inﬂow restrictions pre-
sented in section 2.3 was used as the measure of capital controls. It is im-
portant to clarify that the index’s order of integration is equal to 1, so that
we had to use the ﬁrst diﬀerences to obtain a stationary series. In ﬁgure 2.6,
we present the capital inﬂow controls variation series. From 1983 to 1995,
the series was constructed, as we have already noted, on Cardoso and
Goldfajn (1997) and updated for this article after 1995.
The results were as follows: 
The ﬁrst VAR has the following endogenous variables: 
• Logarithmic variation of the equilibrium real eﬀective interest rate
(LOG(REER_DESV102)), which was calculated as the logarithm of
the ratio between the index value of the real eﬀective exchange rate and
a series trend extracted by applying the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter begin-
ning January of 1995.
• Covered interest parity diﬀerential (CIPD) in continuous capitaliza-
tion, or LOG(1   CIPD), where LOG is the logarithm in the Neper-
ian base.
• Logarithm of the portfolio investment inﬂows as a percentage of the
GDP (LOG(IEC_CRED/PIB)), which is our capital ﬂow measure in
this ﬁrst VAR.
• Finally, the logarithmic variation of the index of capital inﬂow con-
trols (D(LOG(ICC)).
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Fig. 2.6 Restrictions on capital inﬂows (ﬁrst diﬀerence of capital inﬂows 
controls index)The exogenous variables used were the American one-year futures rates
(LOG(1   US1Y)), which summarize the level of international liquidity;
the variation of the index of capital outﬂow controls (D(LOG(ICC_S)),
which was calculated as an exogenous variable because we considered that
economic policy had lifted outﬂow controls independent of capital ﬂows,
as indicated by the downward trend of the ICC-O in ﬁgure 2.3 of section
2.2; and, last, some circumstantial dummies from the period of the Brazil-
ian currency crisis. Dummies for other periods of ﬁnancial crisis were not
signiﬁcant as the eﬀects were probably captured by the endogenous vari-
ables, especially the real exchange rate and the CIPD. The exception was
the wave of speculation in 1998, when there was a large inﬂow of capital
even with the higher sovereign risk, followed by a mass exodus after depre-
ciation, for which a binary dummy variable was applied.
Table 2.1 summarizes the output of the ﬁrst VAR estimation, and ﬁgure
2.7 shows the impulse response function of the portfolio investment in-
ﬂows to new restrictions on capital inﬂows. We see that a new control mea-
sure on capital inﬂows initially reduces the portfolio investment inﬂows
and peaks in the second month. However, its eﬀectiveness diminishes rap-
idly, and up to around six months following its implementation, the eﬀect
on capital ﬂows disappears. Therefore, the exercise indicates that controls
on capital inﬂows in Brazil are temporarily eﬀective, lasting around two to
six months. This period would be the time required for the market to dis-
cover investment alternatives for circumventing the restriction.15
Figure 2.8shows the impulse response function of the capital inﬂow con-
trols to an increase in capital inﬂows: we see that control tends to be tight-
ened when capital inﬂows increase, which is consistent with the ﬁndings on
endogeneity of controls indicated by Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997).
Table 2.2 has the same endogenous variables as the ﬁrst with the ex-
ception of the capital inﬂow measure, which becomes the contracted ex-
change rate inﬂows for ﬁnancial transactions as a percentage of the GDP
(LOG(MOV_CAMBIO_FIN_COMPRA/PIB)). These are data from the
Brazilian Central Bank that report the currency ﬂows from all ﬁnancial in-
vestments except for those going through the CC-5 account, that is to say,
they do not include exchange rate ﬂows from abroad and the CC-5 ac-
counts. This series included all ﬂows from protective capital, direct invest-
ments, and foreign loans. Because the capital controls exempted direct in-
vestment ﬂows, we used these data as an exogenous variable. The other
exogenous variables are the same as those in the ﬁrst VAR.
Figure 2.9 shows the impulse response function of the contracted ex-
change rate inﬂows for ﬁnancial transactions to the new restrictions on
42 Bernardo S. de M. Carvalho and Márcio G. P. Garcia
15. The conﬁdence intervals of the impulse response functions in our exercise are wide and
limit the potential of our results. A similar problem occurred with the VARs of Cardoso and
Goldfajn (1997) and Edwards, Valdés, and De Gregorio (2000). For future research, reﬁning













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)Fig. 2.7 Response of LOG(IEC–CRED/PIB_USD) to Cholesky, one S.D.
D(LOG(ICC)) innovation
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capital inﬂows. Again, the exercise indicates that the eﬀectiveness of inﬂow
controls was temporary and lasted for around two to six months. Figure
2.10 shows the impulse response function of the capital inﬂow controls to
an increase in capital inﬂows and it is also consistent with the ﬁndings on
endogeneity of controls indicated by Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997). The
third VAR will make even clearer the positive correlation between inﬂows
and inﬂow controls.
Table 2.3 uses net investments through Annex IV as the capital ﬂow mea-
sure. No series for capital inﬂows through this channel are available, but only
data on the total portfolio value under Annex IV in the country. Therefore,
in this VAR we used a logarithmic diﬀerence of the Annex IV portfolio as the
measure of net capital inﬂow. As in our other estimations, we considered
capital ﬂows as a percentage of the GDP (D(LOG(CART_ANEXO4/PIB)).
The other endogenous variables were the same as those of the previous es-
timations. As an exogenous variable, we used only one dummy for the
Brazilian currency crisis because the other variables we adopted were not
statistically signiﬁcant in this exercise.
Once again, the impulse response function of the capital ﬂow measure to
a new capital inﬂow control measure (ﬁgure 2.11) indicated that restric-
tions on ﬁnancial inﬂows were eﬀective only temporarily. In the case of
ﬂows through Annex IV, the eﬀect of the controls appears to be even more
transitory, lasting only two to three months. Strikingly, most avoidance
cases, as we saw in the previous section, continued using the Annex IV
Fig. 2.9 Response of LOG(MOVCAMBIO_FIN_COMPRAS/PIB_USD) to
Cholesky, one S.D. D(LOG(ICC)) innovationchannel to invest so as to guarantee tax beneﬁts. The impulse response
function of ﬁgure 2.12 shows the authorities’ reaction to the increase in
Annex IV inﬂows. Greater capital inﬂows using this means led to tighter
restrictions on capital inﬂows. This result shows the endogeneity of capital
controls to capital inﬂows, consistent with the ﬁndings of Goldfajn and
Cardoso (1997).
Therefore, the VAR exercises indicate that the controls on capital in-
ﬂows were eﬀective in reducing ﬁnancial capital inﬂows only for short pe-
riods of time (two to six months). The probable cause of the limited dura-
tion of the restrictions’ impact is avoidance of capital controls by the
market, which continues to invest in the country without incurring in the
capital controls’ costs by renaming the type of investment made, or by con-
ducting ﬁnancial engineering operations.
In the next section, we document and analyze cases of avoidance of con-
trols on capital inﬂows in Brazil. Outﬂow controls have also been fre-
quently avoided since the 1980s through parallel (black) exchange rate
markets, but our analysis focuses only on the eﬀectiveness of controls on
capital inﬂows.
The key point is that measures for controlling capital inﬂows are at best
temporarily eﬀective in containing and selecting capital inﬂows as ﬁnan-
cial agents have been able to dodge them in many diﬀerent ways. The les-
son to be learned is that in open and sophisticated capital markets, controls
on capital inﬂows will probably be ineﬀective because the market has many
alternative assets and transactions that can capture the desired return. In
the following section, we discuss cases of circumvention and show a quan-
titative proof that this circumvention was at work. We do this by docu-
menting the characteristic migration of capital inﬂows among Annex IV
Ineffective Controls on Capital Inﬂows 49





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.items to avoid restrictions imposed on ﬁxed income investments and the
minimum terms for oﬀshore funding.
2.4 Cases of Circumvention of Capital Inﬂow Controls in Brazil
Exchange rate and capital control legislation in Brazil, as previously
noted, has a tradition of being highly complex and intricate. However, the
Brazilian ﬁnancial market is also quite sophisticated, particularly in deriv-
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Fig. 2.11 Response to Cholesky one S.D. innovations   2 S.E., response of
D(LOG(CART_ANEX04/PIB_USD) to D(LOG(ICC))
Fig. 2.12 Response of D(LOG(ICC)) to D(LOG(CART_ANEX04/PIB_USD)atives trading.16 The Futures and Commodities Exchange (BM&F) of São
Paulo, for example, is one of the world’s largest and most active derivatives
exchange, comparable to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Furthermore,
there are extensive derivatives trading abroad with underlying Brazilian in-
struments. One example is New York trading of Brazilian Real/U.S. Dollar
NDFs (nondeliverable forwards). Derivatives allow traders to replicate ﬁ-
nancial strategies originally conceived with the underlying ﬁnancial assets
without the need to trade the underlying assets. For example, a box is a ﬁ-
nancial strategy involving only options that perfectly replicates a bond.
The existence of derivatives makes the task of imposing capital controls
much more burdensome. Because there was a well-established market 
for Brazilian ﬁnancial instruments, including derivatives, there was, ipso
facto, a variety of alternative instruments that made it possible to circum-
vent most capital controls.
Between 1993 and 1999, when investors were prohibited from investing
in domestic Brazilian bonds through Annex IV of Resolution 1289 and
charged a 5 percent to 9 percent IOF, there were many cases where this tax
was avoided. The market found a range of methods for investing in ﬁxed in-
come and enjoying the tax beneﬁts of Annex IV at very low cost. Even to-
day, foreign investors have ways of avoiding the tax on ﬁxed income re-
turns, which is higher than the tax on returns in the equity market.17
In this section (and also in the appendix), we report numerous cases of
capital controls avoidance in Brazil between 1993 and 2000, illustrating
how diﬃcult de facto application of capital controls actually is. We show
that de jure imposition of restrictions in this period did not eﬀectively con-
tain capital inﬂows seeking short-term, tax exempt return on ﬁxed income,
nor was it eﬀective in extending the term of foreign investments on ﬁxed
income.
Garber (1998) addressed the issue of how oﬀshore derivatives trading
may be used to bypass domestic controls. Garcia and Barcinski (1998) and
Garcia and Valpassos (2000) analyzed how avoidance of capital controls
impacted their eﬀectiveness in restricting and selecting ﬁnancial ﬂows, and
they reported a few of the methods used to circumvent controls in Brazil.
Nadal-de-Simone and Sorsa (1999) concluded that the capital controls in
Chile in the 1990s were only temporarily eﬀective in restricting short-term
capital due to capital control circumvention. Edwards, Valdés, and De
Gregorio (2000) concluded that Chile’s capital controls eﬀectively changed
the composition of capital inﬂows, increasing the inﬂows of long-term cap-
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16. Years of crowding out and hyperinﬂation created both a hypertrophy of expertise in
ﬁxed income (short-term) and derivatives trading and a hypotrophy of credit granted by ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries.
17. Foreign investors do not necessarily reside outside Brazil. Brazilian ﬁnancial institu-
tions generally have oﬃces abroad designed to obtain tax beneﬁts given to foreign capital and
also to shield against border risk, or restrictions of capital outﬂows.ital, but they cast doubt on the reliability of this result, which could have
been distorted given that short-term ﬂows could have been labeled as long-
term capital ﬂows, that is to say, eﬀectively bypassing the country’s capital
controls. Forbes (2004) noted that small- and medium-sized companies in
Chile were more burdened by the higher cost of capital than were large
ones because the latter had access to ﬁnancial transactions on the interna-
tional market that would enable them to avoid Chilean capital controls.
In this article we take a more in-depth look at capital controls avoidance
practices in Brazil based on a ﬁeld study involving members of the ﬁnan-
cial market, who oﬀered extensive help in collecting information about
what agents did in Brazil to avoid controls on capital inﬂows between 1993
and 2000.
The large majority of transactions reported was legal and merely took
advantage of loopholes in the intricate exchange rate legislation. They in-
cluded renaming as long-term ﬂows that were ultimately directed at short-
term rate investments. However, they were oﬃcially accounted on the bal-
ance of payments as ﬂows destined for other purposes. For example, many
ﬂows were identiﬁed as “privatization money,” which in theory would go to
ﬁnance privatization programs; short-term capital was disguised as FDIs,
which were not taxed; resources were declared as equity investments when
in fact they were used to obtain ﬁxed income return, and so on. In the fol-
lowing we will provide further details of these forms of circumvention.
The central idea is that ﬁnancial agents were able to use a variety of
means to bypass capital controls. The major restriction was prohibition of
ﬁxed income investments through Annex IV of Resolution 1289, which
carried tax exemption rights, as we reported in the previous section. There
were also numerous restrictions for minimum terms for amortizing over-
seas loans.
Prohibition of ﬁxed income investments through Annex IV is the equiv-
alent of charging an inﬂow tax   that imposes a cost equal to the loss of tax
beneﬁts of investing in ﬁxed income by other means. During the period,
agents could invest in ﬁxed income in Brazil through mutual funds specif-
ically established for such, which were subject to an IOF tax of 5 percent to
9 percent. Hence, the oﬃcial   was the IOF.
However, the de facto cost for the short-term investor was the cost of cir-
cumventing the control, or  ∗, which was certainly less than he or she
would lose by not investing in ﬁxed income through Annex IV. It follows
that the actual cost incurred by the investor due to the capital control is 
 ∗   min { , cost of circumventing inﬂow control}.
Let us examine a few of the circumvention methods reported.18
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18. The methods of passing capital controls were collected by the authors during interviews
with Brazilian ﬁnancial market players. The authors do not have information on who con-
ducted them or even if they actually took place.2.4.1 Disguising Short-Term Investments 
as Long-Term, Equity, or Trade Finance
Case 1: Disguise Short-Term Capital as Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment is considered to be the best form of capital
ﬂow to the receiving country because it is closely associated with investing
in ﬁxed capital and the transfer of technology and, consequently, with ex-
pansion of the potential GDP and employment. It is also thought to be 
the least fungible because compared to portfolio investments it is less re-
versible and has a longer investment horizon. Many articles do argue that
portfolio investments tend to be less stable than direct investments because
portfolio investments can be reversed more easily than real assets can be
liquidated (Dixit and Pyndick 1994; Frankel and Rose 1996; Dornbusch
1998). Thus, direct investments would be less linked to capital ﬂight. For
these reasons, capital ﬂow regulation commonly handles direct invest-
ments diﬀerently than portfolio investments.
Notwithstanding, in an environment of capital controls, when in general
the ﬂow of direct investments wanes, market agents tend to take advantage
of this loophole in exchange rate legislation to disguise their short-term in-
vestments or loans as direct investments, thus bypassing the restrictions
imposed. In Chile during 1996 through 1998, for example, what the Cen-
tral Bank designated “Potentially Speculative Direct Investment” was also
subject to encaje, that is to say, to Chile’s prevailing capital controls. This
was because between 1991 and 1996, when Chile required nonremunerated
deposits of 10 percent to 30 percent for one year for short-term invest-
ments and foreign loans, many agents were found to circumvent the re-
striction by (inappropriately) identifying their ﬂows as direct investments.
In Brazil, we reviewed a transaction, likely to be used even today, de-
signed to disguise short-term capital as direct investment. The transaction
has a simple structure.
At that time, investing in ﬁxed income through Annex IV was restricted,
but the channel was open for equity investments, and there were tax bene-
ﬁts for direct investments. Financial intermediaries could use the transac-
tion to take advantage of these two loopholes.
The ﬁnancial intermediary would create a public corporation (S.A.) and
list its shares on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (BOVESPA). The company
was strictly a legal entity and had no physical activity. Because the ﬁnan-
cial intermediary held all the company’s shares, it could manipulate their
price by arranging purchase and sell transactions with low liquidity. The
price was completely artiﬁcial. The ﬁnancial intermediary, having capital
outside the country, would invest in the company as a foreign investor and
declare this ﬂow as direct investment. It acquired over 50 percent of the
shares and subsequently conducted intercompany loans, considered FDIs.
This money, then, as the company only existed on paper, would be invested
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abroad as proﬁt or dividends. Thus, Annex IV restrictions did not apply,
even though the objective was short-term returns from the high interest
rates of the day.
The cost of establishing this investment in short-term ﬁxed income as a
direct investment was quite low. Given the scale of capital invested, the cost
of opening an S.A. corporation and listing its shares on the exchange was
negligible. The agent’s cost to come into the country, the aforementioned
 ∗, was ﬁxed and much lower than the oﬃcial tax.19 The ﬁnancial interme-
diary’s only expenses were for opening the corporation at the beginning of
the operation. Subsequent investments had no inﬂow costs, meaning  ∗
was equal to zero. The outﬂow costs were determined by legislation govern-
ing proﬁt and dividend taxing of foreign companies, which have been much
more advantageous for investors than taxing of portfolio investment gains.
In fact, proﬁt from foreign capital previously invested and declared in
Brazil is exempt from taxes.
Case 2: Labeling Fixed Income Investments as Equity Investments
As noted in the preceding, the control on Annex IV capital inﬂows ap-
plied to ﬁxed income investments. However, equity investments were not
restricted because growth of the stock market was believed to lead to
greater investment capacity for the companies and to contribute to the
economy’s expansion. Obviously, the market then sought to use the stock
market to gain the coveted returns from the high Brazilian interest rates.
This Case 2 and the following Case 3 refer to avoidance of capital con-
trols through the stock market. Case 2 involves a transaction that also takes
advantage of the structure of the S.A. corporation in Case 1.
To bypass restrictions on ﬁxed income investments via the securities
market, the ﬁnancial intermediary in Case 1 could use the corporation al-
ready created. The ﬁnancial intermediary would then invest in the shares
of that corporation. The means used would be the Annex IV channel for in-
vestments in the BOVESPA, which were permitted at that time and still to-
day provide tax beneﬁts for ﬁxed income investments. Thus, the ﬁnancial
intermediary invested his oﬀshore capital like a foreign investor in the
BOVESPA by purchasing shares of the company he had opened. The
amount paid for the shares was invested in ﬁxed income and the returns
remitted abroad as dividends or capital gains. Note that the ﬁnancial in-
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19. The cost of opening a joint-stock (S.A.) company and listing its shares on the exchange,
without considering programs for attracting investors (contracting banks to manage the
I.P.O., press, advertising, etc.) in 2005, is between US$20,000 and US$100,000. If the ﬁnan-
cial intermediary used this avoidance strategy to invest US$10 million in ﬁxed income, it
would already have saved, in the period when the IOF tax applied, at least US$500,000 in IOF
(5 percent) expenses. The volume invested through this avoidance strategy can be much
greater than US$10 million so that  ∗ could become negligible. termediary could also manipulate the company’s share prices because it
owned a 100 percent stake. Therefore, the investor declared equity invest-
ments while capturing the returns of ﬁxed income.
Again the actual cost of the capital inﬂow in this case, the  ∗, was only
the cost of opening the S.A. corporation and listing its shares on the ex-
change. The cost was low compared to the ﬁnancial volume invested, and
it was also diluted as the investor invested, free of taxes, for several years.
We can thus consider that  ∗ was ﬁxed and much lower than the oﬃcial  .
The descriptions of Case 1 and Case 2 depict two similar methods of
avoiding the restriction on gains from the short-term interest rate in Brazil
between 1993 and 2000. The person interviewed did not, however, wish to
go into great detail, but rather oﬀered a general overview. For the third
form of circumvention, which we will elaborate in the following, we were
able to gather more details. It also involves disguising ﬁxed income invest-
ment ﬂows as equity investments in order to take advantage of the tax ex-
emption provided for in Annex IV.
Case 3: ACC and Trading Companies
To control excessive capital inﬂows into Brazil, especially between 1993
and 1996, many restrictions on raising external resources were imposed.
The prohibition of foreign investments in ﬁxed income under Annex IV, for
example, made it more diﬃcult to raise funds, as loaning resources at ﬁxed
interest rates the investor had to pay the IOF tax because the Annex IV
channel was prohibited. Moreover, minimum terms were required for be-
ginning loan amortization, meaning there were restrictions on short-term
loans. For example, in January 1993, a minimum period of ninety-six
months was established for beginning amortization for principal and in-
terest payments to be exempted from taxes.
At the same time, the use of ACCs for exports allowed for ﬁnancing of
less than 360 days. The exporter could close an ACC up to one year before
shipping merchandise. Theoretically, the ACC was exclusively for ﬁnanc-
ing exports, and ﬁnancing by this means required a physical outﬂow of ex-
ports associated with the contract to demonstrate that the loan had in fact
been used to ﬁnance foreign trade. The market soon saw in this legislation
a way to get short-term loans, which additionally carried tax beneﬁts.
The interest rate for ACC funds was normally less than the CDI, the
short-term-benchmark interest rate in Brazil. This occurred because loans
were less heavily taxed and because foreign investors seeking high return in
Brazil oﬀered capital at interest rates below the country’s base rate due to
restrictions on other investment means. Furthermore, ﬁnancing foreign
trade generally carries relatively low risk as most loans are released only af-
ter the export contract has been signed, and the exports serve as collateral.
Therefore, ACCs constituted a means of getting short-term loans with
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(CDI). This was another opportunity that the Brazilian ﬁnancial market
players eagerly grabbed. The restriction a ﬁnancial investor had to circum-
vent to raise funds via ACCs was demonstrating that the ﬁnancing was as-
sociated with merchandise exports. An agent had a one-year period after
signing an ACC to ship the ﬁnanced export product.
The ﬁnancial investor, of course, was not planning to use the resources
to ﬁnance exports, so he had no product to ship. Exporters conducting for-
eign trade without ACCs, who did not use export ﬁnancing, began selling
their ACC rights to foreign investors. An ACC would then be signed to ﬁ-
nance a speciﬁc export, but the capital would actually go to a ﬁnancial in-
vestor who had purchased the exporter’s right.
In this way, investors made short-term investments at rates below the
CDI using the ACCs and were able to provide export documentation.
Some exporters would pass this credit on to investors. In fact, until 2000
there was an underground market for export credits, that is to say, a paral-
lel market developed for trading export documentation. An investor could
simply make a loan to himself (disguised as an ACC, a loan to a Brazilian
exporter) and buy this export documentation on the aforementioned mar-
ket. A few banks even established trading companies, which specialized in
ﬁnancing foreign trade, to be able to better undertake this capital control
avoidance strategy. These trading companies would contract ACC loans
and then legalize the loan on the parallel market for trading ACC docu-
mentation. Because the ﬁnancing cost was less than the CDI, a bank could
close an ACC to ﬁnance its margin deposit on the BM&F (interest rate de-
rivatives) or the overnight market and capture good returns with these
standard operations. However, the money that theoretically was destined
for ﬁnancing foreign trade was actually invested in short-term ﬁxed income
investments. This is an important example of how diﬃcult it is to apply, de
facto, capital controls.
This means of avoidance only decreased with the liberalization of ﬁxed
income investments and of the loan terms for foreign borrowing. Still today,
though, ﬁnancial market players consider ACCs a way to negotiate better
interest rates as the cost is less than the economy’s base interest rate. There-
fore, there are clear indications that this avoidance strategy would be widely
adopted if new restrictions on short-term capital were imposed, such as ap-
plying an IOF tax on investments provided for in Resolution 2689. Because
Brazilian exports increased remarkably in the recent years, this would pose
an even larger hurdle to the eﬀectiveness of capital controls nowadays.
The capital inﬂow cost, the  ∗, was the amount required to build a ﬁnan-
cial and legal structure for implementing this method of avoidance. The
cost is minimal for a large, functioning bank, which additionally was com-
pensated by using funds borrowed at less than CDI rates and invested on 
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negative.
2.4.2 Using Sophisticated Financial Engineering 
(Derivatives) to Avoid Controls
Case 4: Development of the International Derivatives Market: 
Avoiding Convertibility Risks
An increasingly common method used by international ﬁnancial mar-
kets to avoid imperfect capital mobility in emerging countries (capital con-
trols, risk of additional controls, and convertibility risks) involves foreign
derivatives over-the-counter operations, most notably in New York. For-
eign investors trade local assets but without exposing themselves to the
risks and costs of actually moving resources into the country.
A classic example is the trading of Real against the U.S. Dollar futures
in New York, the currency NDFs. By trading this asset in New York rather
than on the BM&F in São Paulo, the foreign investor avoided all capital
controls and convertibility risks.
Garber (1998) analyzes the development of the international derivatives
market and its impacts on capital ﬂows and reports diverse ways that ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries circumvented regulations on credit risk using de-
rivatives overseas. He also points out the possible role of these oﬀshore op-
erations in avoiding capital controls.
In recent years, the international derivatives market has substantially
developed. One of the main engines of this transnational market is capital
controls and currency convertibility risk in emerging market countries.
They oﬀer assets with greater volatility, which therefore have greater po-
tential return, but the associated border risks hamper investing in the
countries. Because the market wants to trade with them, it has developed
international markets designed to avoid restrictions on capital mobility.
The idea is to break down the risks involved so that one can pick and
choose which risks one wants, with the corresponding returns.
Case 5: Investing through Box Operations: Strategies 
with Options for Earning Fixed Income Returns
Initially, the Annex IV restriction only applied to ﬁxed income invest-
ments. Other types of investments, such as in securities and derivatives,
could still use this channel. The market was able to use these types of in-
vestments to proﬁt from Brazil’s short-term interest rates. Cases 2 and 3
were methods of circumventing the control via the stock market. Another
commonly used method was to use the derivatives market adopting op-
tions strategies that guaranteed ﬁxed return, as we are about to see.
An operation was conducted that was known as a box consisting of four
options, two calls and two puts, with the price on the established strike date
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equal to the benchmark interest rate in Brazil’s case, the CDI.20 A box is,
therefore, a ﬁnancial strategy involving options that is akin to a loan.21
Because derivatives investments were not restricted, the market began
conducting Box operations on the BM&F and the BOVESPA to capture
the return of Brazil’s high base interest rates. This lasted until the Central
Bank detected this market movement and subjected box operations to the
same regulations that applied to ﬁxed income investments.
The box strategy actually went further than avoiding foreign capital con-
trols: it also aimed at saving on taxes levied on domestic ﬁxed income in-
vestments. Instead of using traditional means, like investing in government
bonds, many agents began conducting box operations on the BM&F and
BOVESPA to earn ﬁxed returns and bypass Brazil’s internal revenue ser-
vice’s (Secretaria da Receita Federal [SRF]) regulations. This form of tax
avoidance ended when the SRF detected the loophole in the legislation and
imposed the IOF tax on box transactions as well. However, many agents
were still able to disguise their box operations.
The cost of avoiding capital controls using the box strategy, the  ∗, is
only the cost of conducting the option transactions on an exchange. The
operation itself has no more cost than traditional ﬁxed income investments
because the diﬀerence between earnings from the buying and selling of the
puts and calls is the amount invested. The cost diﬀerence may be only the
brokerage fee charged by the ﬁnancial agents, which is minimal in light of
the volume invested. We can consider, then, that  ∗ in this case is equal to
zero. Therefore, this legislation loophole rendered the capital control com-
pletely ineﬀective.
Case 6: Increased Eurobond Issues with Embedded 
Options for Bypassing the Minimum Loan Term
In August of 1995, the government set a 5 percent IOF tax on foreign
loans in order to avoid excessive capital inﬂows. In September of the same
year, the government changed the legislation in an eﬀort to encourage
long-term loans, establishing a sliding IOF according to the loan term. For
up to two years, the tax was 5 percent, up to three years, 4 percent; four
years, 2 percent; ﬁve years, 1 percent; and six years or more, 0 percent.
The market soon perceived in this legislation a chance for circumventing
the restriction: it began raising funds through issues of long term bonds
(over six years), but with embedded put option clauses. This meant the for-
eign creditor could shorten the loan term by exercising the option. In prac-
tice, therefore, the loan was short term.
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20. The CDI is the base overnight interest rate for transactions between ﬁnancial insti-
tutions.
21. See Hull (2005) for further explanations about box option strategy.The government then began to levy a retroactive IOF if the option was
exercised, and the borrower had to reverse the capital brought into the
country within six years. Those interviewed in our ﬁeld research stated that
it was still advantageous to issue a six-year bond with a put option exercis-
able within one year, even with the retroactive IOF, because this did not
eliminate the transaction’s gains.
This case illustrates the diﬃculty of implementing, in practice, controls
on capital inﬂows. It is an example of a contract subject to capital control
taxes that encourages the short-term investor to disguise his investments as
long term while planning to recover the investment before it matures.
Because the intent of capital controls was to deter excess volatility of
capital ﬂows, the renaming of actual short-term ﬂows as long term would
seriously jeopardize it. After all, if the status quo that prevailed when the
investment was ﬁrst made continued to hold, the short-term capital would,
ex post, become a long-term investment. This appears to have been the
case of Chile (Edwards, Valdés, and De Gregorio 2000). However, if con-
ditions changed, and the carry-trade strategy no longer seemed to be a
good deal, funds would be sent back home. The IOF tax would not be suﬃ-
cient to keep the funds in the country if devaluation or default became very
likely. For example, a 5 percent IOF tax would be suﬃcient to counterbal-
ance a devaluation of only 10 percent within a year with a 50 percent prob-
ability. After the Asian crisis, the odds for devaluation were certainly much
higher than those, which explained why it was worth it to issue a six-year
bond and exercise the option, paying the IOF tax retroactively, if the sce-
nario changed. Carvalho (2005) develops a simple dynamic model that
shows that the tax rates necessary to deter capital outﬂows if a conﬁdence
or currency crisis became likely would be too high to be implemented.
Case 7: Back-to-Back Operations: Blue Chip Swaps and CC-5 Transactions
for Avoiding the IOF on Exchange Rate Transactions
In August of 1995, the government tightened capital controls in an at-
tempt to contain excessive ﬁnancial capital inﬂows, especially short term.
It raised the IOF tax on foreign capital ﬁxed income funds from 5 percent
to 7 percent, raised the IOF on overseas loans from 0 percent to 5 percent,
prohibited foreign investments in the domestic derivatives market,22 and
established a 7 percent IOF on operations between institutions in the coun-
try and overseas through the ﬂoating rate exchange market.
The market avoided the IOF on ﬁxed income investments by engineer-
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22. The complete prohibition of foreign investors to access domestic derivative markets was
the logical culmination of the process that started with the tax on box operations, described
in the preceding. After all, there is a theorem in ﬁnance that states that any return may be re-
produced by option trading if enough options are available. Therefore, taxing one strategy, as
the box, would only make the market move to another, still untaxed, one with quite similar
results.ing ﬁnancial operations like those previously described. But the IOF on
operations between domestic and international institutions drove the mar-
ket to ﬁnd other loopholes in the exchange rate legislation: they found what
they were looking for in the famous CC-5 accounts.
The accounts of nonresidents created by the Central Bank under circu-
lar number 5 in 1969 were a resource for facilitating the ﬂow of foreign cap-
ital. The CC-5 allowed a nonresident institution to hold an account in
Brazil in national currency with greater ease to send funds outside the
country. In 1992, the CC-5 was overhauled, giving this channel greater
freedom implying higher capital account convertibility. With this new
structure, the CC-5 deposit could be freely remitted through the MCTF.
Moreover, third-party deposits could be made to the account, which meant
third parties then began to make international transfers through the CC-5
account. This type of transfer became known later as the “International
Transfer of Reais” (TIR).
Until March of 2005, to send money abroad unilaterally, a resident had
to deposit it in the CC-5 of a ﬁnancial institution residing outside Brazil,
then this institution would transfer it to his bank in Brazil, convert it into
foreign currency, and send it overseas. The nonresident ﬁnancial institu-
tion was usually an overseas branch of the domestic institution. With
changes eﬀected in March of 2005, the resident can now deposit the money
directly in his bank. This simpliﬁcation meant lower transaction costs and
greater transparency on transfers.
Figure 2.13 shows the movement of transfers through the CC-5 from
January 1993 until 2004. It also contains the covered interest parity diﬀer-
ential, which is a measure of country risk. During periods of higher capi-
tal inﬂows to Brazil, even net inﬂows of capital through the CC-5 occurred,
as in 1995 through 1996.23In the exchange rate band period (1995 to 1999),
the CC-5 channel was more heavily used to send resources abroad. This is
associated with the greater restrictions on capital during this period and
with the economic turbulence that shook the Brazilian economy, namely
the crisis in Asia and the crisis in Brazil itself.
The IOF established in August of 1995 on international transactions be-
tween ﬁnancial institutions was assessed at the time of the exchange rate
transaction (like a Tobin tax). So to bypass this tax, the market sought ways
to avoid converting currency. One of these was what was called at the time
a “Blue Chip Swap.” This involved a foreign asset that the investor would
transfer to the oﬀshore branch of a Brazilian ﬁnancial institution against a
CC-5 credit of the investor in Brazil. The foreign investor delivered the for-
eign asset, and the domestic counterpart made the deposit in Brazil in the
foreign agent’s CC-5 account. Through the CC-5, the foreign investor had
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23. As ﬁgure 2.4 clearly shows, the CC-5 net balance was clearly one of net transfers abroad.
Of course, gross ﬂows occurred both ways.free access to the MCTF and sent the money abroad without restrictions
when the operation was ﬁnalized. With this, international transactions be-
tween ﬁnancial institutions bypassed the IOF tax by not oﬃcially convert-
ing currency.
These operations involving unoﬃcial currency exchange, in deﬁance of
the Central Bank’s monopoly, were known as back-to-back operations.
The Blue Chip Swap is one example of this type of operation.24
2.4.3 Disguising Short-Term Investments as Equity and Using
Sophisticated Financial Engineering (Derivatives) to Avoid Controls
Case 8: Labeling Fixed Income Investments as Equity Investments II: 
Share Loans in Brazil and Swaps Abroad
The operation described in Case 3 is designed for a domestic ﬁnancial in-
termediary that also seeks to oﬀer oﬀshore mutual funds to foreign in-
vestors. In truth, these foreign investors could include Brazilians with non-
declared resources abroad or those seeking to capture the advantages
extended to nonresidents of investing in ﬁxed income in Brazil.
The Brazilian ﬁnancial intermediary would oﬀer its oﬀshore clients a
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24. Back-to-back operations are also mentioned as a capital control’s circumvention
method in other countries. For example, an Argentinean journal (Ambito Financiero) pub-
lished on December 22, 2006 states that the tax charged by the money changers for a simple
back-to-back operation was at an unusual rate: 1.25 percent to those willing to have dollars
in Argentina and 1.5 percent to those seeking to take them out.
Fig. 2.13 Capital ﬂows through CC-5 and covered interest parity diﬀerential (CIPD)
Source: Banco Central do Brasil (all years), Brazilian Mercantile and Futures Exchange
(BM&&F), and authors’ calculations.mutual fund in a tax haven that proﬁted from Brazil’s short-term interest
rates. In theory, using Annex IV to this end was prohibited due to the cap-
ital controls. So the ﬁnancial intermediary engineered a ﬁnancial transac-
tion that enabled it to invest in ﬁxed income via Annex IV, avoiding the re-
striction. With this operation, the ﬁnancial intermediary was also able to
save on taxes on the institution’s proﬁt in Brazil.
The strategy basically involved the ﬁnancial intermediary borrowing a
company’s shares that had low liquidity on the BOVESPA, selling them in
a buyback agreement with a foreign investor who entered under Annex IV,
then conducting a swap outside the country with this investor to exchange
returns. If it so desired, rather than borrowing illiquid shares, the ﬁnancial
intermediary could create a publicly held corporation, as in Cases 1 and 2.
Let us examine the case more thoroughly with the help of ﬁgures 2.14,
2.15 and 2.16. In ﬁgure 2.14 we present the operation’s agents: Bank X,
which was Brazilian, had a branch in the Cayman Islands and wanted to
oﬀer an oﬀshore mutual fund that earned the returns of Brazil’s short-term
interest rate and whose quota holders were investors with foreign capital.
The branch of Bank X in the tax haven managed this oﬀshore fund, which
invested in Brazilian ﬁxed income.
To move the fund’s capital into Brazil, an Annex IV Portfolio for equity
investments was opened, and it was managed by the securities dealer
(DTVM) of Bank X with headquarters in Brazil. With this, the agent of the
Annex IV Portfolio was the domestic securities dealer, as required by leg-
islation at that time. Investments regulated by Annex IV of Resolution
1289 had to be made according to this procedure, where a qualiﬁed do-
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Fig. 2.14 Circumvention Case 3: Actorsmestic ﬁnancial institution was the agent of the foreign investor’s invest-
ment portfolio.
The securities dealer of Bank X also retained its own portfolio for in-
vestments in ﬁxed income, legally independent of this Annex IV Portfolio.
The national resources of Bank X were allocated to this ﬁxed income port-
folio to capture the returns of the high domestic interest rate.
The bank also borrowed the shares of a company whose shares were
listed on the BOVESPA and had very little liquidity. It’s worth highlighting
that this was a company that did exist physically, not one created solely for
ﬁnancial transactions. Illiquidity was key to prevent sudden price moves.
In ﬁgure 2.15 we present the beginning of the transactions, which we di-
vide into two steps. The second part of the transaction is illustrated in ﬁg-
ure 2.16.
(1) The oﬀshore fund invested in its Annex IV Portfolio declaring its ob-
jective was obtaining returns on equity investments, which was permitted
and had tax beneﬁts. (2) The securities dealer of Bank X borrowed the
company’s shares, which we will call Z, and (3) sold them through a buy-
back agreement after a speciﬁed period of time to the Annex IV Portfolio
of the oﬀshore fund. The buyback agreement established the deadline for
recovering the sale of the shares and stipulated that the buyback would be
based on the share price on the day the contract expired. (4) The money
from the sale of the shares loaned to foreign investors was invested by the
securities dealer in its own ﬁxed income portfolio.
The foreign investor, then, brought his resources into the country via
Annex IV and transferred them to the securities dealer by purchasing the
shares of Company Z. The securities dealer then invested this money in the
overnight interest rate.
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Fig. 2.15 Circumvention Case 3: Operations (t   1)Figure 2.16 illustrates the operation’s unwinding.
(5) The buyback agreement was then settled. The Annex IV Portfolio
resold the shares to the bank’s securities dealer, but because the shares had
very low liquidity, their prices were easily manipulated. The bank drove the
share price up and repurchased them at a price higher than that at which
he had sold them to the foreign investors. All players on the ﬁnancial mar-
ket know that the main rule is “buy low and sell high,” but in this case, the
bank preferred to sell low and buy high. There was a reason for this: it en-
abled him to embed a loss for the securities dealer in this operation, reduc-
ing his proﬁts. Bank X would then save on Brazilian taxes due to the dealer’s
proﬁt, and as we shall see, recover the loss in Cayman through the deriva-
tives market.
(6) After buying back the loaned shares, the securities dealer returned
them to the Company Z shareholder who had entered into the loan agree-
ment. (7) The return made by the Annex IV Portfolio of the foreign in-
vestors on the share purchase operation was sent abroad legally through
Annex IV as it was gained on the stock market.
(8) The securities dealer obtained the returns of its ﬁxed income portfo-
lio. (9) The dealer then nationalized the money in its Cayman branch, which
was perfectly legal. The amount sent to the tax haven was equal to the prin-
cipal plus interest earned by the ﬁxed income portfolio, that is, the amount
desired by the oﬀshore fund oﬀered by the Bank X branch in Cayman.
So the return the oﬀshore fund desires was still with the Bank X branch
in Cayman, and the loss incurred by Bank X in the share transaction was
passed as the proﬁt of the oﬀshore fund. (10) To ﬁnalize the operation and
meet its objectives, the bank conducted a swap in Cayman between its
branch and the oﬀshore fund, where they exchanged the gains from the
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Fig. 2.16 Circumvention Case 3: Operations (t   2)share transaction with the ﬁxed income returns. The swap’s underlying in-
struments were the diﬀerence between the price of Company Z shares on
the BOVESPA and the return on the Brazilian ﬁxed rates, so the ﬁxed in-
come return went to the fund and the proﬁt from the share transaction
went to the branch of Bank X.
When concluded, the foreign investors had the ﬁxed income returns and
Bank X had saved on Brazilian taxes. The capital inﬂow cost incurred by
this circumvention method, the  ∗, was only the price of borrowing the
shares and conducting the swap abroad, plus that of the bank to national-
ize the money in its Cayman branch. The latter two items have virtually no
cost, so that  ∗ is only the cost of the share loan. But because the bank
saved on taxes,  ∗ could actually be negative as the tax savings oﬀset the
cost of the share loan. This strategy provides a clever example of how reg-
ular corporate income taxes could also be avoided through a ﬁnancial op-
eration originally designed to avoid capital controls.
2.5 Conclusion of Cases of Capital Controls Circumvention
In the preceding section, we have presented diverse strategies for cir-
cumventing controls on capital inﬂows in Brazil in the 1990s. Most strate-
gies were designed to avoid the IOF tax on ﬁxed income investments that
was imposed with the prohibition of investments in government bonds us-
ing the Annex IV channel although we also reviewed cases with strategies
for bypassing the IOF on foreign exchange transactions and the minimum
terms for foreign loans.
Controls on capital inﬂows in Brazil varied based on two factors: the
amount of capital inﬂows and the means the market found to bypass re-
strictions.
The ﬁrst point was addressed by Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997), who
pointed out the endogeneity of capital controls in Brazil. In periods of
heavy capital inﬂows, restrictions were placed on the capital inﬂows, and
in periods of scarce foreign ﬁnancing, the controls were lifted so as to at-
tract foreign capital.
The second point was addressed in Garcia and Barcinski (1998) and in
Garcia and Valpassos (2000), who pointed out the consecutive changes in
legislation aimed at closing the loopholes the market found for circumvent-
ing restrictions. In fact, analyzing the composition of the total portfolio of
Annex IV investments, one readily perceives the game of “cat and mouse”
underway between the Central Bank/CMN and the ﬁnancial market.
Table 2.4 shows the composition of the total portfolio of Annex IV in-
vestments from January 1993 until mid 2004 (since 1999, these investments
have actually been governed by Resolution 2689).
Between January 1993 and August 1993, the “Others” item in the table
accounted for around 15 percent to 25 percent of total investment. This
item contained investments in government bonds that were destined for
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Annex IV Composition (% total)
Portfolio Privatization Fixed
value (in Equity Derivatives Debentures currency Others income
US$ billions) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Jan. 1993 2.37 82.50 0.00 2.30 0.00 15.20
Feb. 1993 2.35 73.90 0.00 4.80 0.80 20.50
Mar. 1993 2.49 85.00 0.00 0.30 1.50 13.20
Apr. 1993 3.42 79.00 0.00 3.80 0.10 17.10
May 1993 4.05 80.00 0.00 2.20 0.10 17.70
June 1993 4.83 82.60 0.00 2.70 0.10 14.60
July 1993 5.15 73.50 0.00 4.80 0.10 21.60
Aug. 1993 6.88 70.30 0.00 4.00 0.50 25.20
Sept. 1993 6.76 77.20 0.00 19.00 2.60 1.20
Oct. 1993 7.45 68.20 0.00 29.30 1.60 0.90
Nov. 1993 8.96 65.20 0.00 33.60 0.90 0.30
Dec. 1993 10.38 80.10 0.00 18.50 1.10 0.30
Jan. 1994 12.12 82.50 0.00 15.90 1.40 0.20
Feb. 1994 13.23 83.32 0.00 14.14 2.33 0.21
Mar. 1994 14.51 78.26 4.93 13.31 3.40 0.10
Apr. 1994 12.83 75.32 4.19 15.97 4.44 0.08
May 1994 12.97 67.90 7.60 16.10 8.33 0.07
June 1994 13.57 66.68 8.60 15.16 9.49 0.07
July 1994 16.15 70.99 5.66 15.12 7.84 0.39
Aug. 1994 21.31 73.40 5.40 11.20 5.20 4.80
Sept. 1994 21.61 78.10 3.20 12.30 5.00 1.40
Oct. 1994 20.77 77.35 4.06 12.72 5.13 0.74
Nov. 1994 21.83 78.62 4.02 11.15 5.56 0.65
Dec. 1994 20.97 77.54 3.85 12.41 5.41 0.79
Jan. 1995 17.84 76.69 1.95 13.93 5.86 1.57
Feb. 1995 15.76 77.44 3.20 12.20 6.20 0.96
Mar. 1995 13.30 82.77 1.43 8.43 4.26 3.11
Apr. 1995 15.08 84.87 2.32 6.80 5.24 0.77
May 1995 16.99 85.84 1.24 7.89 4.39 0.64
June 1995 16.92 85.19 2.13 7.61 4.42 0.65
July 1995 18.58 84.78 2.96 7.57 4.12 0.57
Aug. 1995 20.63 86.46 3.19 5.94 3.75 0.66
Sept. 1995 19.75 86.35 3.01 6.02 4.12 0.50
Oct. 1995 18.97 86.51 1.89 7.22 3.79 0.58
Nov. 1995 18.81 88.95 0.66 4.95 3.72 1.72
Dec. 1995 18.65 89.46 1.09 5.54 3.68 0.23
Jan. 1996 20.29 90.84 0.04 4.72 3.52 0.88
Feb. 1996 20.33 90.33 0.04 4.46 4.14 1.03
Mar. 1996 19.27 89.79 0.09 4.75 4.32 1.05
Apr. 1996 19.77 89.16 0.09 5.64 3.92 1.19
May 1996 21.21 90.09 0.05 5.66 3.48 0.72
June 1996 23.33 91.11 0.03 4.48 3.21 1.17
July 1996 23.28 90.22 0.00 5.65 3.59 0.54
Aug. 1996 24.07 90.51 0.00 5.52 3.45 0.52
Sept. 1996 25.03 91.06 0.00 5.63 3.19 0.12
Oct. 1996 25.71 91.22 0.00 5.58 3.27 –0.07
(continued)Nov. 1996 26.63 91.53 0.00 5.50 3.20 –0.23
Dec. 1996 28.16 91.96 0.00 5.72 2.79 –0.47
Jan. 1997 31.71 92.58 0.00 4.85 2.11 0.46
Feb. 1997 34.75 93.06 0.00 4.45 1.94 0.55
Mar. 1997 36.35 93.30 0.00 4.32 1.88 0.50
Apr. 1997 38.89 94.21 0.00 3.65 1.74 0.40
May 1997 40.94 94.85 0.00 3.29 0.19 1.67
June 1997 46.03 95.16 0.93 2.99 0.92 0.00
July 1997 49.89 95.47 0.69 3.00 0.84 0.00
Aug. 1997 42.64 94.79 0.63 3.71 0.87 0.00
Sept. 1997 46.11 95.24 0.56 3.37 0.83 0.00
Oct. 1997 35.56 94.43 0.88 4.00 0.69 0.00
Nov. 1997 34.73 95.67 0.52 3.08 0.72 0.01
Dec. 1997 35.78 96.46 1.39 2.12 0.00 0.03
Jan. 1998 29.19 95.75 1.93 2.28 0.03 0.01
Feb. 1998 30.90 96.38 1.48 2.11 0.03 0.00
Mar. 1998 34.87 97.30 1.27 1.40 0.02 0.00
Apr. 1998 35.31 96.49 2.04 1.45 0.02 0.00
May 1998 30.06 96.67 1.57 1.73 0.03 0.00
June 1998 28.72 96.50 1.57 1.73 0.03 0.17
July 1998 30.97 96.69 1.66 1.62 0.03 0.00
Aug. 1998 20.21 94.57 2.53 2.86 0.04 0.01
Sept. 1998 17.21 95.25 3.48 1.22 0.05 0.00
Oct. 1998 18.00 95.49 3.37 1.11 0.04 0.00
Nov. 1998 21.42 96.84 2.30 0.83 0.03 0.00
Dec. 1998 17.37 94.80 4.16 1.00 0.04 0.00
Jan. 1999 11.85 94.90 3.85 0.81 0.00 0.43
Feb. 1999 11.83 95.50 3.59 0.71 0.07 0.13
Mar. 1999 16.02 97.60 1.61 0.50 0.10 0.10
Apr. 1999 18.04 97.90 1.42 0.46 0.20 0.03
May 1999 17.54 98.40 0.90 0.52 0.20 –0.02
June 1999 18.23 98.76 0.23 0.72 0.29 0.00
July 1999 17.09 98.95 0.19 0.69 0.15 0.02
Aug. 1999 15.90 98.72 0.02 0.92 0.10 0.24
Sept. 1999 17.51 98.72 0.02 0.87 0.30 0.10
Oct. 1999 17.79 98.70 0.08 0.83 0.28 0.11
Nov. 1999 20.00 98.77 0.09 0.81 0.20 0.13
Dec. 1999 23.11 98.98 0.04 0.82 0.02 0.14
Jan. 2000 22.32 98.48 0.09 1.17 0.01 0.25
Feb. 2000 22.95 98.49 0.07 1.26 0.01 0.17
Mar. 2000 23.10 98.44 0.06 1.29 0.01 0.20
Apr. 2000 22.45 96.83 0.05 1.36 0.01 –0.01 1.76
May 2000 20.05 96.42 0.11 1.19 0.01 –0.01 2.28
June 2000 23.07 94.13 0.10 1.15 0.01 0.01 4.61
July 2000 23.58 91.63 0.05 1.24 0.01 0.45 6.62
Aug. 2000 23.61 92.67 0.13 1.23 0.01 0.19 5.77
Table 2.4 (continued)
Annex IV Composition (% total)
Portfolio Privatization Fixed
value (in Equity Derivatives Debentures currency Others income
US$ billions) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)Sept. 2000 21.09 92.52 0.16 1.27 0.01 0.12 5.92
Oct. 2000 18.93 91.48 0.15 1.31 0.01 0.12 6.93
Nov. 2000 17.78 90.89 0.24 1.26 0.01 0.10 7.50
Dec. 2000 18.53 91.92 0.05 0.91 0.01 0.07 7.04
Jan. 2001 21.25 92.58 0.10 0.89 0.01 0.05 6.37
Feb. 2001 18.55 92.35 0.05 0.67 0.01 0.08 6.84
Mar. 2001 17.09 89.71 0.16 0.78 0.01 0.07 9.27
Apr. 2001 18.65 89.20 0.26 0.84 0.01 0.03 9.66
May 2001 17.75 88.32 0.23 0.80 0.01 0.04 10.59
June 2001 17.82 89.47 0.14 0.72 0.01 0.04 9.61
July 2001 15.81 87.17 0.15 0.70 0.01 0.04 11.93
Aug. 2001 14.62 86.47 0.55 0.72 0.01 0.05 12.20
Sept. 2001 13.99 75.99 0.70 2.33 0.01 0.03 20.94
Oct. 2001 13.67 78.67 0.16 2.79 0.01 0.85 17.52
Nov. 2001 14.42 85.02 0.50 1.54 0.01 1.07 11.86
Dec. 2001 15.50 88.45 0.29 0.73 0.01 1.20 9.32
Jan. 2002 14.59 87.44 0.75 0.67 0.01 1.41 9.73
Feb. 2002 16.57 89.08 1.97 0.34 0.01 0.22 8.37
Mar. 2002 16.34 90.24 0.41 0.60 0.01 0.22 8.52
Apr. 2002 16.78 89.55 1.48 0.59 0.01 0.11 8.27
May 2002 15.02 89.72 1.38 0.59 0.01 0.11 8.19
June 2002 12.31 87.50 2.03 0.67 0.01 0.11 9.68
July 2002 9.18 83.20 4.21 0.57 0.01 0.11 11.90
Aug. 2002 10.22 85.56 3.64 0.43 0.01 0.20 10.16
Sept. 2002 9.96 77.29 5.19 0.43 0.01 0.16 16.92
Oct. 2002 8.95 79.97 3.14 1.01 0.01 0.20 15.67
Nov. 2002 9.06 78.75 3.02 1.11 0.01 0.17 16.94
Dec. 2002 10.40 74.70 2.35 1.15 0.01 0.27 21.51
Jan. 2003 10.04 73.84 1.88 1.24 0.01 0.30 22.72
Feb. 2003 9.85 72.13 3.26 1.29 0.01 0.32 22.99
Mar. 2003 10.68 76.43 2.85 1.47 0.01 0.31 18.93
Apr. 2003 12.48 78.05 2.69 1.43 0.01 0.40 17.41
May 2003 12.64 80.01 1.71 1.39 0.01 0.38 16.50
June 2003 12.80 80.30 1.20 1.40 0.01 7.19 9.90
July 2003 13.31 80.94 1.44 1.50 0.01 0.51 15.60
Aug. 2003 14.60 82.81 1.19 1.38 0.01 0.48 14.13
Sept. 2003 15.05 83.94 1.07 1.24 0.01 0.48 13.26
Oct. 2003 18.68 76.76 4.61 0.95 0.01 0.43 17.23
Nov. 2003 17.64 86.10 0.82 0.94 0.01 0.50 11.63
Dec. 2003 20.12 86.79 0.62 0.68 0.01 0.30 11.60
Jan. 2004 20.02 86.84 0.61 0.57 0.01 0.28 11.69
Feb. 2004 20.72 86.30 0.50 0.60 0.01 0.29 12.30
Mar. 2004 20.96 86.02 0.55 0.57 0.00 0.35 12.51
Apr. 2004 20.40 85.21 2.29 0.57 0.00 0.26 11.67
May 2004 18.41 87.40 1.10 0.65 0.00 0.23 10.62
June 2004 18.50 87.67 1.31 0.84 0.00 0.24 9.94
Table 2.4 (continued)
Annex IV Composition (% total)
Portfolio Privatization Fixed
value (in Equity Derivatives Debentures currency Others income
US$ billions) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)ﬁxed income gains. Investments in government bonds directed toward pri-
vatization were discriminated in the item “Privatization Funds.” The other
portfolio components were investments in securities, derivatives, and
debentures. Since 2000 and the publication of Resolution 2689, the ﬁxed
income investments item has been distinguished from the “Others” item.
With the August 1993 prohibition of Annex IV ﬁxed income invest-
ments, the 25 percent of “Others” in the portfolio has fallen to approxi-
mately just 1 percent as investments in government bonds with this objec-
tive could no longer be declared under Annex IV. The investments then had
to be made via special ﬁxed income funds for foreign capital, which in-
curred an IOF tax of 5 percent to 9 percent.
However, in the month following this prohibition, September of 1993,
the percentage of debenture investments jumped from 4 percent to 19 per-
cent, reaching 34 percent in November, indicating the market had begun
circumventing by investing in debentures that earned ﬁxed income, such as
those of the Siderbrás Company. At the end of November of 1993, the gov-
ernment placed a restriction on some debenture investments, but only in
February of 1996 prohibited investing in those of Siderbrás.
After debenture investments were restricted in November of 1993, the
market began bypassing the IOF tax on ﬁxed income investments using the
loophole for using privatization funds and the derivatives market (using
box operations as explained in the preceding). The table shows that the
percentage of privatization funds rose in September of 2003 and peaked at
almost 10 percent of the Annex IV Portfolio in June of 1994. The govern-
ment then prohibited NTN investments (Treasury bonds) with privatiza-
tion resources,25 precluding ﬁxed income gains through this loophole. The
percentages for derivatives were only made available beginning in March
of 1994, and we are unable to trace the development of these ﬂows.
Finally, only equity investing was left unrestricted, and the other items
were subject to diverse rules before permitted to invest through Annex IV.
The market then began to use circumvention strategies involving the stock
market, as seen in Cases 2 and 3 in the previous section. Another method
that has been adopted since August of 1993 was disguising short-term cap-
ital as direct investments as described in Case 1. These two methods for cir-
cumventing the controls were not prohibited by any legal measure. Strate-
gies such as the one in Case 2 may still be used by ﬁnancial institutions
seeking to avoid the income tax on ﬁxed income gains, which is higher than
that on capital market gains, or to invest in ﬁxed income for less than ninety
days without paying the 5 percent IOF tax.
The market, then, appears to always ﬁnd a means of circumventing re-
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25. Funds in privatization funds were allowed to be invested in domestic bonds until the pri-
vatization took place. However, investors parked their funds in the bonds indeﬁnitely to avoid
the tax, without true intention to participate in privatizations.strictions placed on foreign capital, rendering capital controls ineﬀective 
in the medium term. However, the price to be paid in terms of how the 
market is viewed when controls are imposed could endure for some time.
Some argue that ex ante controls on capital inﬂows do not compromise the
country’s reputation and are prudent measures for avoiding destabilization
caused by excessive capital inﬂows. However, to quote one of the ﬁnancial
market agents that we interviewed in our ﬁeld research: “An ex-alcoholic
can’t touch a bottle of whiskey.” Also, the operations of controls on capital
inﬂows are not very well understood and may create misunderstandings
harmful to the country’s reputation. For example, in the aftermath of the
Mexican 1994 crisis, Brazil reduced the IOF on capital inﬂows. The (albeit
temporary) reduction of a tax should be considered a liberalization; how-
ever, it was taken by two highly trained scholars as just the opposite.26
As expressed in Forbes (2004), economic literature has still not been able
to prove conclusively that imposing controls on capital inﬂows eﬀectively
reduces the vulnerability of the countries that employ them. Forbes states,
“although capital account liberalization may increase country vulnerabil-
ity to crises in some cases, the relationship between capital controls and ﬁ-
nancial crises is not so straightforward” (2004, 18). However, the literature
extensively defends increased liberalization of the capital account: ﬁnanc-
ing via foreign savings allows for more investment, increased potential
GDP, and intertemporal consumption smoothing.
Our main conclusion is that although from a welfare point of view ex
ante capital controls may be desirable in certain cases, their implementa-
tion when sophisticated ﬁnancial markets are present is very diﬃcult. This
ineﬀectiveness comes from three facts:
1. Developed ﬁnancial markets are very good in performing arbitrage.
2. Capital is fungible.
3. Usually, a country wants to control only a few forms of capital in-
ﬂows (e.g., short-term portfolio investments) while providing total free-
dom to other forms (e.g., long-term ﬁxed investment).
With these three characteristics, ﬁnancial markets can lower the cost of
eﬀectively investing in the country, as we have documented for Brazil.27
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26. “Capital ﬂows to developing countries fell by one-ﬁfth from 1993 to 1994, with the Feb-
ruary rise in U.S. interest rates often viewed as the turning point. At the same time, while some
countries stayed the course to liberalization, others which had earlier liberalized (for example,
Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Nigeria) resorted to re-imposing capital controls or to tight-
ening existing regulations and delaying announced liberalization plans”; Drazen and Bar-
tolini (1997).
27. One market player remarked that things may have changed somewhat in regard to the
ability of the ﬁnancial market to avoid controls. This would be because current legislation car-
ries penal liabilities to the partners of institutions that are found guilty of breaching the leg-
islation. Therefore, ﬁnancial market players may have become more risk averse in devising ﬁ-
nancial engineering strategies to avoid capital controls, but that remains to be seen.2.6 Conclusion
We have analyzed the eﬀectiveness of controls on capital inﬂows in re-
stricting and selecting ﬁnancial inﬂows. We saw that in Brazil in the 1990s,
controls on capital inﬂows only eﬀectively limited ﬁnancial inﬂows for
short periods: two to six months. The hypothesis we submitted was that op-
erations aimed at avoiding capital controls during this period rendered in-
eﬀective the measures and restrictions. We gave numerous examples of the
operations that were reportedly used in this period and that allowed exter-
nal investors to invest in Brazil while bypassing government restrictions.
The ability to circumvent controls on capital inﬂows implies that the cost
of short-term capital inﬂows is not necessarily the oﬃcial tax rate imposed
by the capital controls, but rather the lesser of the two between the oﬃcial
tax rate and the cost of avoiding the controls. We reported numerous cases
in Brazil during the 1990s that showed that the cost of circumventing cap-
ital controls in that period was less than that of complying with regulation.
As such, the eﬀectiveness of measures restricting capital inﬂows was very
limited. We conducted an analysis using impulse response functions to
measure the eﬀectiveness of inﬂow controls in restricting ﬁnancial inﬂows
in Brazil in the 1990s, and we found that the measures were able to reduce
capital inﬂows for up to six months. Financial inﬂows through the Annex
IV channel—which were often seen as the short-term villains at the time—
were even less aﬀected and reversed the impact of the restriction in only
two to three months.
The impact of capital controls avoidance on their eﬀectiveness has not
yet been thoroughly addressed in economic literature. It is common to as-
sume that the implementation of the controls is a given and to disregard the
eﬀect of circumvention. However, the imposition of capital controls will be
inﬂuenced by the following factors: the development of the domestic ﬁ-
nancial market and alternatives in overseas derivatives markets (which en-
large avoidance alternatives); the ability of authorities to monitor inﬂows;
the penalties for avoidance; and, the most diﬃcult to prevent, regulation
loopholes.
In summary, the eﬀectiveness of controls on capital inﬂows will depend
on the market’s ability to circumvent restrictions and the government’s
ability to establish a covered interest parity diﬀerential that will balance
capital ﬂows. As long as the country’s risk-adjusted earnings are attractive
for the carry-trade strategy, controls on capital inﬂows will be at best only
temporarily eﬀective in a developed, sophisticated ﬁnancial market. And
policymakers should take this restriction into account when designing eco-
nomic policies. Capital controls may very well be desirable, a topic we do
not discuss here. But if they are ineﬀective, there is no point in spending the
scarce resources of bank supervision trying to implement them. Instead,
improving economic policy should be the main focus.
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Other Circumvention Methods
Case 9: Privatization Currency
Another loophole in Brazil’s capital control legislation between 1993
and 1995 was that it granted permission for funds investing in the country’s
privatization to use Annex IV for investing in national treasury notes
(NTNs). Initial legislation sought to encourage inﬂows of foreign capital
directed at investments in privatization, but the market began establishing
short-term ﬁxed income investments as privatization investments, thereby
capturing the tax beneﬁts of investing in Brazil’s domestic debt through
Annex IV. This method of capital control avoidance seemed to be widely
employed. One indication is that the ﬂow for privatization via Annex IV
between April and July of 1993 averaged US$4.36 million. In August of
1993, a capital control was applied that prohibited ﬁxed income invest-
ments via Annex IV and permitted only investing through speciﬁc ﬁxed in-
come funds that were subject to a 5 percent IOF tax. In September of 1993,
the ﬂow declared as privatization resources rose to US$176 million. This
means that when ﬁxed income investments were restricted, the ﬂow de-
clared as destined for privatization increased more than 3000 percent in
less than two months.
Case 10: Resolution 63 “CAIPIRA” (“Country 63”)
Another strategy for raising foreign funds with tax beneﬁts was provided
for by Central Bank of Brazil Resolution number 63 for agriculture ﬁnanc-
ing. The operation was similar to those involving ACCs. Rural producers
were permitted to borrow abroad, with tax beneﬁts, and began selling them
to ﬁnancial investors so that short-term loans declaring agricultural desti-
nations were a common market practice. The loan, however, was redirected
to ﬁnancial market transactions.
In general, the cost of these loans was also less than the CDI. This meant
that the same strategy undertook with ACCs could be replicated with the
“63 Caipira,” that is, raising funds at a cost well below the CDI and invest-
ing the money in the overnight market or in margin deposits required by
the BM&F interest derivatives. The capital that in theory was for agricul-
ture investments was actually redirected to short-term ﬁxed income invest-
ments. The transaction was strictly within legal boundaries because rural
producers oﬃcially took out the loans.
Through this 63 Caipira strategy, investors raised funds at short-term
rates to perform the carry-trade. At the same time, investors with foreign
capital could use this channel to invest in ﬁxed income given the ease with
which it was redirected to the ﬁnancial market. This legislation loophole
meant gains for both the borrower and the lender.
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63. The institution’s 1996 Report clariﬁed: “In order to avoid the applica-
tion of resources from long term loans in speculative investments. Circular
No. 2.660, of 2.8.96, limited the alternatives for investing funds raised un-
der Resolution 63 when not used by their ﬁnal borrower” (107).
The next case of circumvention involves a loophole in legislation that
permitted investments in debentures under Annex IV. Prices of some of the
debentures were linked to Brazil’s benchmark interest rate, opening a door
for bypassing restrictions on ﬁxed income investments.
Case 11: Siderbrás Debentures and Others
One method for avoiding the restriction on ﬁxed income investments
with tax beneﬁts provided for by Annex IV was to take advantage of the
loophole in legislation that permitted investing in debentures through this
channel. Between August 1993 and November 1993, this loophole allowed
investors to earn the returns of ﬁxed income by investing in debentures that
were linked to the base interest rate. One example involved the debentures
of the company Siderbrás.
In August of 1993, the volume of debenture investments under Annex 
IV was US$275 million, or 4 percent of the total Annex IV Portfolio in 
the country. In September, after the capital control was introduced, this
amount jumped to US$1.3 billion, and in November of 1993 reached its
highest to date at US$3 billion, or 34 percent of the portfolio. In Novem-
ber of 1993, the government prohibited debenture investments using An-
nex IV, closing the door on this form of circumvention.
In this section’s conclusion, we exhibit a table with the composition of
the total Annex IV Portfolio in the country, and we analyzed, as in Garcia
and Barcinski (1998), the dynamic of ﬂow shifts among items in Annex IV
prompted by capital controls.
The cost of bypassing controls by investing in debentures, the  ∗, was
zero, because the yield of these debt instruments was tied to the interest
rates sought by investors and, moreover, oﬀered the tax beneﬁts of Annex
IV investments.
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Comment Gustavo H. B. Franco
The issue of the eﬀectiveness of capital and foreign exchange controls in
general, and their relevance for emerging markets in particular, has always
been a high temperature one, though in recent years, given advanced glob-
alization, banking and ﬁnancial crises, and the worldwide adoption of the
Basel Accord, new ramiﬁcations in the basic issue of eﬀectiveness are yet
to be properly addressed. While old-style foreign exchange controls are be-
ing phased out around the world, adversaries of globalization increasingly
align capital controls as one crucial mechanism to sand the wheels of in-
ternational ﬁnance. The notion of an international Tobin Tax has been es-
pecially appealing to these audiences and popular to some politicians
though no practical application has yet been truly discussed. Mainstream
economists and central bankers do not generally take proposals along
these lines very seriously, most usually dismissing capital controls across
the board with the same arguments normally thrown at price freezes and
other forms of artiﬁcial intervention in the working of markets. It is true,
however, that the velocity with which antiglobalization proposals to limit
capital mobility are sidelined is not the same at which public policy has ad-
vanced in the topic of capital account convertibility as a general proposi-
tion. In fact, the 1997 defeat of the proposal to advance in this realm in the
context of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) can be taken as an eloquent demonstration that there was less cer-
tainty in this ﬁeld than many people thought. Indeed, an indication toward
this ambiguity is the development of two distinct branches of empirical lit-
erature: one positive, on the association of measures of capital mobility, or
convertibility, and economic growth, and another negative, on the associ-
ation between capital mobility and currency crises; neither, actually, is es-
pecially conclusive. Indeed, the successive episodes of instability, sudden
stops, banking and currency crises, not to mention the growing concern
with money laundering and terrorism’s money, have made deregulation in
the ﬁnancial industry, especially when it involves international transac-
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suggestions to this comment. Views herein are mine, under the usual caveats.tions, a very cautious process. Yet in one way or the other, the debate on the
regulation of foreign exchange transactions, and within which the scrutiny
on capital ﬂows, has been kidnapped into the grand world controversy
around globalization where it was torn by ideological misconception and
prejudice. While antiglobalization groups intend to save the world with
capital controls, mainstream economics seems unprepared to concede any
role for capital controls or regulation even in times of unambiguous exu-
berance.
The question to address, however, in connection with Carvalho and
Garcia’s paper, is very much circumscribed to a speciﬁc context, namely,
whether there is some middle ground between these extremes, when one
considers a brief but relevant episode of targeted restrictions to short-term
capital inﬂows into 1993 to 1998 Brazil, combined with a liberalization of
outﬂows, and during years in which there was little doubt that a “capital
surge” was taking place. My personal position at the Central Bank, start-
ing in October, 1993 as deputy governor in charge of International Aﬀairs
and directly responsible for the creation and implementation of the regu-
latory changes in the ﬁeld of foreign exchange regulation through 1997,
when I was elected governor, where I stayed until early 1999, places me at
a privileged position to look back at the episode from a ﬁrsthand practi-
tioners’ point of view, though in a somewhat uncomfortable position to
judge “ineﬀectiveness,” as argued by Carvalho and Garcia. The reader
should be warned of the presence of bias in the views expressed in what fol-
lows, which, I guess, might be a redundant advice in this profession.
Some context is also very much required. In the early 1990s, Brazil was
still enforcing old-style foreign exchange controls, though with great
strides toward liberalization. Foreign exchange shortage seemed to be the
rule since the 1950s, and the notion of excessive inﬂows, bound to deserve
restrictions rather than incentives, was by all means novel. Indeed, in the
early to mid-1990s, these were times in which the concern with “capital
surges” and its consequences to exchange rates (and the concrete threat of
the “Dutch Disease” phenomenon) led to academic production and also
practical experiences with various sorts of impediments to capital inﬂows
deemed of a “lesser quality,” as in Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993),
Corbo and Hernández (1996), Dooley (1995), Gavin, Hausmann, and Lei-
derman (1995) and Schadler et al. (1993).1 More speciﬁcally, the experi-
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1. The conclusion of Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993, 149) may oﬀer a fair summary
of the wisdom of these years.
To summarize, there are grounds to support a mix of policy intervention based on the
imposition of a tax on short term capital imports, on enhancing the ﬂexibility of ex-
change rates, and on raising marginal reserve requirements on short term bank de-
posits. Given the likely ﬁscal cost, it is hard to make a strong case in favor of sterilized
intervention, unless countries exhibit a strong ﬁscal stance and capital inﬂows are ex-
pected to be short lived. In any case, we believe that none of the above policies willence of Chile, and also of some Asian countries, received some attention in
the late 1980s and early 1990s while excess liquidity had been there, in some
cases, for more than a decade, and there are mixed reviews as to the eﬀec-
tiveness of controls. Yet as the pendulum of world liquidity retreated from
abundance to scarcity a few years later after the Asian, Russian and other
crisis that followed, it was curious to see that capital account convertibility
fell into disregard, and the idea of restriction to inﬂows, as a way to reduce
the impact of sudden stops, regained some popularity even where it was
criticized. As put by Fischer (2002, 12–13):2
The IMF has cautiously supported the use of [market-based capital in-
ﬂow controls,] Chilean style. These could be helpful for a country seek-
ing to avoid the diﬃculties posed for domestic policy by capital inﬂows.
The typical instance occurs when a country is trying to reduce inﬂation
using an exchange rate anchor, and for anti-inﬂationary purposes needs
interest rates higher than those implied by the sum of the foreign inter-
est rate and the expected rate of currency depreciation. A tax on capital
inﬂows can help maintain a wedge between the two interest rates. In ad-
dition, by taxing short-term capital inﬂows more than longer-term in-
ﬂows, capital inﬂow controls can also in principle inﬂuence the compo-
sition of inﬂows....  I n  a  n utshell: capital controls may be useful
provided they are exercised with care; they are likely to be transitional—
albeit possibly in use for a long time—and caution is likely to be neces-
sary in removing them.
Restrictions are never popular in this profession, nevertheless, and look-
ing back at the speciﬁc Brazilian 1993 to 1998 experience with controls im-
posed on inﬂows, even considering that this was combined with deregulation
on the outﬂow side, it is not too uncommon to see economists attempting to
ﬁt these measures into the stereotype of bureaucrats trying to ﬁght market
fundamentals with pointless controls. Capital and foreign exchange con-
trols are easy targets, and mainstream profession would always be willing
to welcome the claim of ineﬀectiveness of controls in general, and the one
provided by Carvalho and Garcia for the Brazilian experience in particu-
lar, especially if we miss the details, and these details can be very confusing
to academic researchers with incidental contact with the practitioners’
world. Carvalho and Garcia’s paper has the undisputed merit of penetrat-
ing the obscure realm of the trading desks to see what actually takes place
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drastically change the behavior of the real exchange rate or interest rate. The choice of
appropriate policies, however, could decidedly attenuate the detrimental eﬀects of sud-
den and substantial future capital outﬂows.
2. Italics are mine. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that, as to the restrictions
to capital inﬂows in Brazil, the Fund had mixed views and loudly ignored what was going on
for quite some time. By 1997, in view of the commitment to the attempt to amend the Articles
of Agreement toward capital account convertibility, there was some indication that the Fund
did not like the restrictions Brazilian style.in response to speciﬁc policy or regulatory measures. Whether they suc-
ceeded in forming a comprehensive picture and a fair judgment is an en-
tirely diﬀerent matter. In fact, in what follows, it is argued that the eleven
alleged examples of circumvention of controls and restriction to inﬂows
are not as nearly relevant as argued. If not outright unimportant, then
some of the examples are such as to deserve so many qualiﬁcations that
Carvalho and Garcia’s conclusion is mostly invalidated. Yet in arguing
along these lines, one does not intend to make a case for exchange controls
or capital controls in general, neither a case for the eﬀectiveness of restric-
tions to inﬂows as a general proposition, in times of capital surges. The
point here is that under the particularly exuberant circumstances lived by
Brazil in the mid 1990s, and having in mind a number of institutional fea-
tures of the relevant market environment and associated regulation and in-
stitutions, the regulatory innovations for both inﬂows and outﬂows were
relevant and eﬀective given their terms of reference. The relevant metric to
assess eﬀectiveness as we move into the third- or fourth-best realm where
the practitioners are found are diﬃcult to obtain. Yet a look at the data on
the amounts of taxes (on capital inﬂows) collected and on the nature of in-
ﬂows (average tenor, spreads, volumes) also help to raise serious doubts on
Carvalho and Garcia’s conclusions.
The rest of this comment is divided into three sections: the ﬁrst section
draws attention to the new regulatory realities and particularly to the role
of controls to banking operations in a world ruled by the Basel Accord
within which it is quite important to have in mind the size of the penalties,
and even criminal implications, of evading or circumventing the regulator’s
directives. The second section provides speciﬁc clariﬁcations on each of the
circumvention possibilities and indications on how the Central Bank acted
on each situation. The last section presents numbers for the collection of
taxes on capital inﬂows of several types, which are signiﬁcant, thus weak-
ening the circumvention claim. In addition, the data on the nature of the
mainstream capital inﬂows into Brazil 1992 to 1999 reveal a clear trend to-
ward extended maturities in external loans, even with signiﬁcantly de-
creasing spreads. The aim of restrictions, the improvement in the quality of
inﬂows, was accomplished; the precise magnitude of their contribution of
restriction certainly deserves more work.
Controls and Compliance after the Basel Accord
As a background to more speciﬁc observations as to the alleged eleven
ways to circumvent controls to inﬂows, one should bear in mind that,
notwithstanding undisputed sophisticated ﬁnancial markets creativity and
the fact that capital can move around under countless types of disguises,
foreign exchange transactions are basically banking transactions and, as
such, subject to the scrutiny of regulators on several grounds. As one asks
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selective controls on capital inﬂows are feasible or even when one argues
that such controls are eﬀective only in the short run, what is at stake is
whether the Central Bank is capable of looking into speciﬁc operations of
banks and imposing limitations to certain families of transactions. In fact,
there is no reason to assume that forex transactions are any less an object
of the regulators’ surveillance than any other banking transaction. In fact,
these days past the Basel Accord, most controls directed to banking activ-
ities have been internalized through compliance rules that aim at aligning
interests of the regulator and its subjects. Internal compliance rules have
been created and developed by all banks around the globe with the more
speciﬁc objective of minimizing problems with the regulator in all its areas
of concern, from risk-weighted capital, credit scoring, and derivatives ex-
posure to the precise identiﬁcation of clients and the nature of foreign ex-
change operations. Indeed, the control of capital inﬂows can be seen as an
activity conducted by banking supervision departments, which are per-
fectly capable of monitoring individual transactions and exercising the dis-
cretionary power to veto speciﬁc trades or deals as they are seen as possible
violations in existing regulations, whether targeting risk, crime, or other
endeavors.
It is a fact that banks comply with directives of central banks as a gen-
eral proposition, even when they restrain their activities and proﬁt possi-
bilities. In many cases, banks go beyond the Central Bank’s directives. If,
for instance, the Central Bank issues guidelines regarding foreign exchange
transactions aiming at preventing money laundering, it is common to see
banks expanding the directive into their compliance departments in order
to prevent any questioning that might be transformed into very costly lia-
bilities or damages to the bank’s reputation. It is rare to see anyone ques-
tioning the overall compliance, for instance, to Basel rules regarding risk
weighted capital, even though the bypassing may be as proﬁtable as the by-
passing of capital controls. Why then should one assume that banks would
be willing to jump at any possibility to bypass regulatory directives in the
subject of limitations to capital inﬂows of certain kinds when banks tend
to be “well behaved” in other areas?
Indeed, there is no literature or bias in the issue of alleged ineﬀectiveness
of Basel rules or banking regulation at large as there is in the case of capi-
tal controls. However, as it is common to see in the regulation and in the
“crime and punishment” literature, one may say compliance is a game in-
volving a payoﬀ highly dependent on not being caught breaking the law.
Yet in the repeated game between banks and their regulators, and in view
of the importance of reputation in this business, and also for the normal
ﬂow of banking, one hardly see banks challenging aggressively and re-
peatedly regulatory directives, especially when the negative payoﬀ of a
controversy with the regulator may be very costly penalties possibly en-
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and discrepancies in views during the course of the banking supervision
activity and a wide range of activities, from credit scoring and associated
provisioning to foreign exchange transactions, but the instruction of the
regulator is always the ﬁnal word in practically all matters related to bank-
ing supervision. Why does this propensity to discipline not exist when di-
rectives are concerning controls to capital inﬂows? Why is this particular
subset of regulations less eﬀective than the rest?
It is true that there were times past, long ago, in which foreign exchange
regulation was so unrealistically restrictive that one would see the devel-
opment of black markets and curb markets, yet not usually within the
banking system and mostly involving cash transactions. It is hard to imag-
ine that controls to capital inﬂows would be such as to provoke any major
dislocation toward the black market or that the restricted portions of the
capital account of the balance of payments could be channeled into trans-
action technologies and platforms mostly used by criminals. As a practical
matter, it is not possible in Brazil for the parallel market to develop outside
the ﬁnancial systems in a dimension large enough to disturb macroeco-
nomic policies. It is well known that a black market remains in existence in
Brazil, as in any other country in the world, in which transactions are al-
most exclusively in cash and related to crime.3
In addition to the argument made in the preceding that banks strive to
preserve a good working relationship with the regulator when it comes to
compliance, it is also important to clarify the exact nature of penalties and
problems related to the violations that may be involved in the eleven alleged
circumvention operations described by Carvalho and Garcia. Seven of
these eleven Cases (1, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9) involve penalties deﬁned in Article
23 of Law 4.131/62, according to which, the furnishing of “false informa-
tion” (paragraph 2) in foreign exchange operations contracts and “fraud”
(or “false identity,” paragraph 3) in such contracts would trigger penalties
of up to 100 percent and up to 300 percent of the value of the contract re-
spectively. In both cases, penalties are applicable not only to the seller of
foreign exchange but also to the bank, sometimes to their directors, and to
the broker if acting on the operation. This is an incredibly powerful direc-
tive as it makes the bank a partner to the sponsor of any wrongdoings as-
sociated with the foreign exchange transaction. This is reason enough for
banks to be very selective when it comes to creative operations or more
compliance prone in this area than they normally are.
These seven operations also involve violations in tax laws as they result
in evading the tax due at the time of the foreign exchange sale (often the tax
on ﬁnancial operations [IOF] but also, sometimes, on the withholding tax
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3. For a review of empirical ﬁndings on the size and scope of black markets around the
world with much consideration given to developed countries, see Galbis (1996).on income earned) and the attempt to disguise the liability. Penalties are a
multiple of the tax values due and unpaid and are comparable to the ones
applicable by the Central Bank for the violation of foreign exchange regu-
lations (which are proportional to the principal amount involved), but
their consequences are far worse as tax evasion is also a crime. Further-
more, in these seven transactions, in addition to tax evasion, there are also
other crimes involved such as ﬁnancial fraud and conspiracy. In fact, both
the foreign exchange authority and the tax authority are obliged to inform
the Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) of the possiblepresence of crime
(if they do not inform, these authorities may face criminal charges them-
selves). Based in such reports, prosecutors usually do not hesitate in start-
ing criminal investigations, often followed by wide press coverage, on the
parts involved. It is not hard to imagine the amount of the damage that
could do to banks and the eﬀort of compliance units to prevent any occur-
rence that might possibly entail such course of events.
In view of the preceding, it seems hardly likely that any signiﬁcant num-
ber of banks would enter in any signiﬁcant amounts of transactions of
these types considering the risks of getting caught and the consequences of
such conducts. Compliance units exist with the precise aim at avoiding
conducts that might lead to confrontations with the regulator. Of course,
lots of anecdotal evidence may be collected on ideas or attempts of by-
passing regulations on capital inﬂows, especially amongst traders, as one
considers the agency problem that evolves as traders try to force quasi or
even fully illegal transactions onto their employers as they would earn the
bonuses before the regulatory, tax, and criminal charges and liabilities are
presented later on, when traders have already moved into diﬀerent banks.
These were the years in which Nick Leason was active in Singapore; some-
thing along these lines may have taken place in Brazil, though with little
macroeconomic relevance. The collective memory of trading desks from
times of regulatory change must be treated with considerable caution as it
moves into the realm of the academic debate on the eﬀectiveness, however
deﬁned, of the regulatory policy mix implemented in 1993 to 1998 Brazil.
The “Circumventions”
After these general comments, we turn to speciﬁc observations on the
eleven models of transactions depicted as ways to circumvent controls or
taxes on inﬂows of capital. It is useful to group the transaction according
to their nature and examine what took place separately.
Disguised FDI
From the onset, one should squarely disregard Cases 1 and 2 that, in the
point of view of the undersigned, belong in the realm of fantasy. Given the
documentary needs of companies with foreign ownership in Brazil, the
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sanctions mentioned in the preceding. It is true that the Central Bank saw
a more intensive usage of inter company loans, and very speciﬁcally in
1993, but the increase in foreign direct investment was much larger, dis-
solving the impression that multinationals could have been using loans to
undertake ﬁnancial arbitrage and in excess of what would be normal to ex-
pect in light of their equity investments into Brazil.
Portfolio Investment under Annex IV
It should be said from the start that the misrepresentation, on the part of
the investor and the bank undertaking the forex transaction, of a given in-
vestment through the regulatory window for inﬂows of foreign portfolio in-
vestment (Cases 4, 7, and 9), known by an acronym related to the regula-
tory directive, “Annex IV,”4 would involve the violations and penalties as
described in the preceding. The problem here was not circumvention but
grandfathering ﬁxed income investments made before the restrictions, thus
avoiding complaints along the lines of disrespect of contracts and preserv-
ing the ex ante character of the restrictions. In fact, in order to be worthy
of what Stanley Fischer described as “market-based” restrictions, a key as-
pect of the restrictions would be that their nature and cost should be fully
known before the foreign investor decides to invest. In this connection,
Brazil preferred to work with a tax paid at the moment of entry, with no
other obligations in the future, than the Chilean system of a quarantine,
necessarily involving the Central Bank receiving, managing and remuner-
ating deposits from investors for prolonged periods of time.
Yet the problem with Cases 4, 5, and 7 was that foreign investment into
some speciﬁc ﬁxed income instruments in Brazil before December 1993
could take place through the portfolio investment foreign exchange win-
dow—Annex IV—without any misrepresentation. Commodities mutual
funds, debentures, privatization currency (securitized Treasury bonds),
and derivatives (entailing constructions such as the box with options deals,
producing a synthetic of a ﬁxed income instrument) were all permitted up
to mid-1993. From then on, each such instruments was withdrawn from
Annex IV in a sequence and moneys invested thereof had to be reallocated.
In each case, as time was given to investors to reallocate their investments
into diﬀerent instruments, one saw a sequence of shifts of resources in a
succession as resources into commodities mutual funds ﬂew partly into
debentures then partly to box with options, until all varieties of ﬁxed in-
come instruments were formally forbidden. The fact that these restrictions
were not done all at once, but in sequence, produced these shifts, which
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4. Resolution 1,289 of the National Monetary Council (the regulatory body with the legal
competence to issue foreign exchange regulation) regulated portfolio investment in its varied
forms. The annexes of the Resolution had regulations for each family of investments. The
most popular was Annex-IV, regulating investments into the Brazilian stock exchange.gave the impression of a cat and mouse game. More essentially, however,
there was little or no circumvention as resources were already invested
within the country in Real denominated instruments. At the end of 1994, 
all new ﬂows into the portfolio investment window fell to US$5.0 billion,
from US$6.5 billion in 1993, while the inﬂows into the special class of 
ﬁxed income funds created for the speciﬁc purpose of removing all ﬁxed 
instruments, even synthetics from the portfolio investment rules, received
US$1.3 billion, with all taxes duly paid, as seen in table 2C.1 in the follow-
ing. Another vehicle, “Privatization funds,” was created to capture in-
vestors’ interest in privatization, received US$1.9 billion in 1994. The fact
was that after the grandfathering was completed through 1994 and after,
there was practically no claim or indication of any ﬁxed income invest-
ments into Annex IV, except for rumors of operations known as Blue Chip
Swaps examined later.
The CC-5 Accounts
Case number 10 involves nonresident banking accounts within Brazil
(known as “CC-5 accounts”) that enjoy full convertibility. Indeed, because
the nonresident that can open such an account must be a bank, and this
bank can transact on behalf of third parties, one is right in pointing out
that this vehicle, in theory, represents a full ﬂedged opening of the capital
account. The interesting question to raise here is why this platform is not
used more widely as there is no restriction whatsoever in the amounts and
on the nature of the transactions made at the outﬂow end.5Interestingly, the
problem here is disclosure. Any such transactions would necessarily in-
volve the full identiﬁcation of the parties involved and all explanations as
to the nature of the transaction made. And, of course, at the inﬂow end, if
the transaction is identical or even similar to the ones that involve a special
tax payment or any other restriction, the Central Bank will make sure that
restrictions are obeyed and taxes paid or simply instruct the bank not to do
or to undo the transaction. The public and the regulator scrutiny on the
movements in the CC-5 accounts is very severe, given cases of fraud, mis-
use, and money laundering, and for this very reason banks and individuals
tend to be extra careful with transactions of this kind; it does not seem
plausible that operations to circumvent restrictions to inﬂows were made
in this channel in any signiﬁcant way; it suﬃces to look at the ﬂows that are
chronically negative. In any event, explicit taxes on inﬂows through CC-5
accounts were enacted by mid-1995 in line with the taxation of ﬁxed in-
come mutual funds.
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5. For a review on the status of the capital account liberalization in Brazil, see Franco and
Pinho Neto (2005).Leads and Lags
Case 5 in Carvalho and Garcia treats as circumvention what may be de-
scribed as an exception. In Brazil, exporters are allowed to enjoy leads, that
is, to anticipate export revenues through bank lines oﬀered by local banks
against the collateral of the export receivables. These advances were made
and continue to be made at international costs and indexed to the dollar.
They are perfect to allow exporters to arbitrate interest rate diﬀerentials,
and surely a very relevant part of the proﬁtability of exporting from Brazil
is related to this possibility. Many see this as a ﬁnancial subsidy, as ex-
porters are thus capable of undertaking interest rate arbitrage in ways that
were forbidden to ﬁnancial players more generally by this time. Yet the fact
that restrictions and taxes to short-term inﬂows could not reach leads and
lags undertaken by exporters and importers meant that these groups were
exempted from the restrictions, which, however, did not seem to bother
regulators at all as any help into exporters proﬁtability and into the in-
crease in import penetration ratios was warmly welcome in times the for-
eign exchange anchor was deemed crucial to end hyperinﬂation. There was
some concern, however, with the case of a nonexporter who could go into
a Brazilian bank, draw funds from a line backed by export receivables he
did not actually possess, and use the resources to invest in ﬁxed income in-
struments. The only condition this fellow had to obey was to actually prove
the shipment of such exports after a maximum of 180 days. There were
some such cases, and what happened, though in a small scale, was that this
fellow would have to purchase export performance from an exporter that
did not advance receivables. The exporter would sell his rights at a pre-
mium, capturing most of the gain of the arbitrageur. Again, the exporter
would stand to gain, even if some of the gain is reaped by the ﬁnancial mid-
dlemen. Again, there was no circumvention, or loss of eﬀectiveness, as de-
scribed.
Derivatives, BTBs, and BCSs
Case 11 is not really a transaction; it is more like a statement of fact, or
faith, that in a world so rich in derivatives, including speciﬁcally nondeliv-
erable forwards (NDFs) traded over the counter in New York or futures in
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), anything is possible, namely a
“synthetic” of a ﬁxed income investment can be made in New York or in
the Caribbean without anybody bothering with foreign exchange and
banking regulations in Brazil. Yet this is only true if some connection is es-
tablished with the ﬁxed income market in Brazil; if not, how can the inter-
est rate arbitrage be done?
With derivatives, loans, or stocks, one can indeed build what has been
called a “back-to-back” (BTB) operation. Case 7 is one such operation, not
quite the typical one. The most common was what was called the “blue chip
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connection with CC-5 accounts, and also mentioned in the preceding as re-
lated to Annex IV. It consists of two theoretically unconnected transac-
tions done in Brazil and oﬀshore. A bank buys, for instance, Petrobras
American depository receipts (ADRs) with a repo in New York, and the
Brazilian branch of the same bank sells the same stock with a reverse repo
agreement. The foreign leg of the deal was exactly the opposite of the
Brazilian leg, the short and long positions in the same asset cancel out, but
the diﬀerent ﬁnancing cost at both repo and reverse repo operations is
where the interest rate diﬀerential could be captured, if and only if the same
entity could bank the two legs at the same balance sheet and other market
risks are controlled for.
As these deals started to appear, many regulators, in Brazil and abroad,
jumped in to understand the transaction and ﬁt it into their rules. Tax au-
thorities in Brazil grasped the spirit of the transaction, as it involved very
visible ﬁngerprints in the stock exchange, and attacked very directly all
parties suspect of such dealings. The Central Bank, in turn, leveraged the
attack as the foreign exchange regulation forbids what is called “private
compensation,” or schemes through which parties evade a foreign ex-
change transaction oﬀsetting credits and debits on shore and oﬀshore.
Penalties here may go up to 100 percent of the values transacted.
The BCS deals existed much more as legend than fact, and known deals
were subject to very high penalties whose values were made public to fur-
ther discourage banks from undertaking such risks.6 The BTB deals be-
came a primary model of laundering moneys oﬀshore that could not enter
the country either in view of tax consideration or worse. During the course
of 2005, in a high proﬁle Congressional Commission of Inquiry, it was
found that the Workers Party appeared to have entered into several BTB
transactions to use illegal campaign money held abroad to pay for things
and bribe people within the country. This deal certainly belongs to the cir-
cumvention family described by Carvalho and Garcia: moneys held
oﬀshore by Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) could have been deposited in
an oﬀshore branch (or parallel bank) of a Brazilian bank, which, quid pro
quo, lent money to PT in Brazil through an intermediary, entirely out of
market conditions, especially regarding collateral.
Indeed, as a conclusion, one may admit that there are many theoretical
ways to circumvent banking and foreign exchange regulations and under-
take fraud. It is an entirely diﬀerent matter to presume that this could be
done on large scale to the point of turning regulations into a pointless ex-
ercise, given compliance discipline and penalties involved.
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6. Often the Central Bank implemented its penalties and informed the tax authorities,
which, however, queue the process so as to apply the penalty only at the year before the expi-
ration of the ﬁve-year prescription period.IOF Collection and the Nature of Inﬂows
Last, some interesting pieces of evidence could be oﬀered to provide
some comfort to taxpayers, understandably concerned about Carvalho
and Garcia’s allegations. One of the most important restrictions to inﬂows
subject to the accusation of ineﬀectiveness, given alleged circumvention
possibilities, is the IOF, the ﬁnancial transactions tax due after the liqui-
dation of certain foreign exchange transactions. I searched my archives to
ﬁnd the documents used at the time by the Central Bank to indicate the
amounts to be collected by the tax authorities. Table 2C.1 oﬀers the esti-
mates of the Central Bank of the amounts collected in the several varieties
of incidence of the IOF tax through time. Even though these amounts are
not the ones reported by tax authorities based on actual collection,7 there
is no reason to doubt that these amounts were actually paid as the Central
Bank works technically as a substitute to the tax authority requesting the
proof of tax payment in order to conﬁrm the registration of foreign capital
along the lines of existing legislation and to authorize any remittances such
as interest and repatriation.
Table 2C.1 provides a history of the IOF usage for that purpose as it cov-
ers all changes occurring between November of 1993—when the ﬁrst pres-
idential decree was issued creating the possibility of taxing certain foreign
exchange transactions at certain rates and delegating to the Finance Min-
ister limited powers to change the tax rate—until June of 1996. This spe-
ciﬁc cutoﬀ date is arbitrary; the active use of the IOF continued more or
less unchanged at a restrictive stance until the Asian crisis, when most re-
strictions were removed and tax rates changed to zero. Early in 1998, how-
ever, after what was seen as a very successful response to the Asian crisis—
a combination of a ﬁscal package with monetary tightening—capital
inﬂows regained momentum very rapidly, international reserves reached
their all time high, and, as a consequence administrative restrictions to in-
ﬂows were reinstated, and the IOF tax on certain types of inﬂows was
reestablished very quickly. A few months later, with the Russian and long-
term capital management (LTCM) crisis, such restrictions were removed
and were not to be seen again.8 Table 2C.1 does not cover the whole period
in which the IOF and other restrictions to inﬂows were deployed—No-
vember 1993 to mid-1998—but its coverage and numbers provide impor-
tant indications as to the impacts of the IOF on capital inﬂows.
During the period covered by table 2C.1, the total amount collected was
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7. These, by the way, are not published with this level of detail.
8. The procyclical character of restrictions to capital inﬂows should be seen as an obvious
thing, at least in the minds of those, amongst whom I am included, who created and managed
these instruments through time: for what otherpossible reason would the authorities possibly
introduce such restrictions? Yet for those interested in econometric technique to set proof of




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































$slightly over a billion dollars, including what is reported in the table, in ad-
dition, (a) the revenues produced by the IOF on inﬂows directed to the
stock exchange, which were taxed with a rate of 1 percent between No-
vember of 1994 and March 1995, with estimated revenues of US$88 mil-
lion; and (b) the revenues produced by the 7 percent IOF on CC-5 based
inﬂows in force from September 1995 to the last month covered by the
table, with total revenues of US$24 million.
Table 2C.1 shows that the ﬁxed income funds lost their popularity after
the 9 percent IOF tax, the same happening to privatization funds after the
5 percent IOF tax early in 1996. In any event, the largest part of the taxable
inﬂowswas in the foreign borrowing column; it was on this region that most
of the Central Bank’s action—through the IOF and through minimum
tenors—was conducted. Table 2C.2 helps complete the picture of the im-
pact of restrictions to capital inﬂows into Brazil during these years.
The numbers in table 2C.2 cover the most part of the capital account so
that if there is any ﬁeld of play as regards the impact of restrictions, whether
taxes of minimum tenors, it is here. The period covered starts when the
concern with excessive capital ﬂows started and goes up to the ﬁrst quarter
of 1999. It is very clearly visible that the number of issues and volumes grew
constantly, with some seasonal variation and also with declines entirely
within what would be expected in mid-1994 (critical months of the Real
Plan), early 1995 (Tequila Crisis, very short lived) and 1997-IV (the Asian
crisis). The impact of the Russian and LTCM crisis is way much larger than
all the other crises, as we all know.
The one interesting aspect of this table in connection to the topic of this
note refers to the average maturity and the spreads. The trend toward lower
spreads only highlights the importance of the fact that tenors are extended
more or less constantly through time.9One should note that IOF taxes pic-
tured in table 2C.1 combines with direct impositions as to minimum
tenors, for instance, in order to aﬀect the outcomes reported in table 2C.2.
There seems to be no doubt that as one looks into the evolution of these
ﬂows that the quality (tenors and spreads) improved through time, just as
aimed by the regulatory restrictions, whether tax or administrative. In or-
der to argue the ineﬀectiveness of regulatory policies toward improving the
quality of capital inﬂows, one has to seek alternative explanations for the
developments shown in table 2C.2. The course of economic reforms and
the success of the Real Plan are surely very relevant explanations to the im-
proved access to international capital markets, but most likely with a little
help from regulatory restrictions to short-term inﬂows.
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9. Carvalho and Garcia rightly remark that since withholding tax on interest on foreign
loans depended on the maturity and that there were restrictions as to minimum maturities,
there were several cases of “puts” and “calls” designed to shorten the maturity, if necessary.
These options were reported to the Central Bank and were denied if their exercise would con-
ﬂict with minimum tenors required, but accepted otherwise. In these cases, the withholding
tax was charged as if the loan was shorter.References
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Comment Marcelo Abreu
It is perhaps important to insist on the persistent relevance of the issue
in Latin America as populist strains of economic policy prove to be ex-
tremely resistant in several economies, and a backlash does not seem out
of the question in the more extreme cases. Only last Monday (November
28, 2005), Brazilian newspapers carried an article by a former Finance
Minister who feigned surprise to ﬁnd out that there were still economists
who proposed a deepening of the liberalization of capital controls in
Brazil.
Carvalho and Garcia’s paper is structured in three parts. There is a per-
haps too short history of capital controls in Brazil, followed by a detailed
discussion of cases of circumvention of capital controls between 1993 and
2000, and a vector autoregression analysis testing whether controls on cap-
ital inﬂows in Brazil have been eﬀective in reducing the inﬂow of ﬁnancial
capital.
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Janeiro.It would be interesting to have a bit more material and also more preci-
sion on the historical aspects on capital ﬂows. It does not ring true that ex-
change rate controls did not apply to foreign direct investment in the past.
Recurrent wrangles about how reinvestment should be treated both in the
early 1950s and in the early 1960s had to do with registration of reinvest-
ment as foreign direct investment and so with capital controls even if in a
roundabout way. Still clearer is the relevance of circumvention of desin-
centives of foreign direct investment inﬂows implied in the incredibly com-
plex multiple exchange regimes adopted in the 1950s. The possibility of im-
porting capital goods without going through the foreign exchange market
was a vital discretionary element in the attraction of foreign direct invest-
ment coupled with all sort of subsidies, absolute protection, and carefully
controlled right of establishment.
The treatment of a long list of techniques used to circumvent capital in-
ﬂow control is extremely interesting. But perhaps too many circumvention
cases are examined in detail in the paper, with a resulting loss of focus. It
would be useful to have such cases classiﬁed under some taxonomy. Focus
could then be centered on those circumvention techniques that are less
country speciﬁc or relatively more sophisticated. Good candidates would
be short-term capital ﬂows disguised as foreign direct investment (Case 1),
labeling ﬁxed investments as equity investments (Cases 2 and 3) and in-
vesting through box operations with options for earning ﬁxed income re-
turns (Case 4). And also swaps of blue chips and CC-5 (nonresident ac-
counts) positions (Case 10) and trade in international derivatives markets
(Case 11). The other cases—privatization currency (Case 5); ACC (foreign
forward currency arrangements; Case 6); Central Bank of Brazil (BACEN)
Resolution 63, so-called Caipira operations (Case 7); Siderbrás debentures
(Case 8); bond issues with options to exceed the minimum loan terms (Case
9)—seem all to be of relatively secondary interest and too speciﬁcally fo-
cused on Brazilian recent experience. It would have been good to get a
clearer picture of the relative actual and potential importance of such cir-
cumvention techniques even if based on rough estimates of market size.
The econometric analysis depends crucially on measures of the impor-
tance of capital controls. The indexes for capital inﬂow and capital outﬂow
controls are derived from the accumulation of speciﬁc measures intro-
duced by the Brazilian authorities updated to 2004 (Cardoso and Goldfajn
1998). These indexes are a rather crude proxy to measure restrictions im-
posed by capital controls as recognized in a speciﬁc note. But the ac-
knowledgment is perhaps not enough to reassure us. Very signiﬁcant mea-
sures are deemed to have had the same impact as rather minor ones, for
instance, for the period before 1995, minor changes in travel foreign ex-
change allowances and major changes in the taxation of foreign borrow-
ing. It would perhaps pay to go beyond counting and look more closely
94 Bernardo S. de M. Carvalho and Márcio G. P. Garciainto speciﬁc measures and assess their relative importance so as to capture
their diﬀerent intensity.
It is slightly disturbing that indexes purporting to measure the impact of
capital controls inﬂow do not somehow reﬂect the paper’s essential idea,
which is that capital controls lose power over time. The paper’s conclusion
would seem to imply a criticism of the index used to measure capital con-
trols.
In any case a list of measures that were considered relevant in 1995 to
2004 would be welcome and complete extant lists for the former period
(Cardoso and Goldfajn 1998).
The vector autoregression analysis testing whether controls on capital
inﬂows in Brazil have been eﬀective in reducing the inﬂow of ﬁnancial cap-
ital covers only the 1995 to 2001 period. Does the number of observations
warrant too strong conclusions based on the vector autoregression anal-
ysis? Zero impulses are included within intervals of conﬁdence in all four
exercises based on diﬀerent capital inﬂow measures. These problems
should have been explicitly discussed.
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